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Should All Drugs Be Patentable?:
A Comparative Perspective
Cynthia M. Ho*
ABSTRACT

Although there has been substantial discussion of the proper
scope of patentable subject matter in recent years, drugs have been
overlooked. This Article begins to address that gap with a comparative
perspective. In particular, this Article considers what is permissible
under the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), as well as how India and Canada have utilized
TRIPS flexibilities in different ways to properly reward developers of
valuable new drugs, while also considering the social harm of higher
prices beyond an initialpatent term on drugs.
This Article brings valuable insight into this area at a critical
time. Many have noted that the industry is in a crisis because, despite
exponentially increasing expenditures, the number of new drugs
produced has been stagnant. Moreover, a predominant number of the
slim pipeline features drugs that are not highly innovative. At the
same time, the industry and some academics are seeking to increase
protection of drugs in the United States and beyond, which could
further exacerbateexisting problems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Should all
typical response
policy makers is
should not only
protection will

drugs be patentable? In the United States, the
of many patent-owning companies, scholars, and
that all drugs meeting existing patent standards
be awarded a patent, but also that increased
necessarily promote more drug development.'

1.
E.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patentlaw-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION] (noting that the
pharmaceutical industry testified that "strong patent protection is essential to innovation"); Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615-17 (2003)
(recommending liberal interpretation of existing requirements for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology inventions); Benjamin Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 557 (2009) (arguing that current US patent standards
"suppress" innovation); Intellectual Property ProtectionsAre Vital to ContinuingInnovation to the
Biopharmaceutical Industry, PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org/innovationlintellectual-property
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015); PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2014,
24, available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdfl2014-special-301-submission.pdf
[hereinafter PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION] (arguing for increased patent protection in other
countries); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419 passim (2014) (arguing that at least in the United States, there is a
cognitive bias that presumes more patent protection for drugs is desirable and without
consideration of negative repercussions). Although some scholars with an interest in promoting
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However, other countries take a more cautious approach. As will be
discussed, the different approaches seem to mirror different cultural
concerns about the importance of promoting public health, including
access to affordable medicine.
Although some countries may believe that patents on drugs
unduly compromise the ability to promote access to low-cost drugs,
most countries do not have the freedom to completely deny patents on
all drugs in a world where most countries are members of the World
Trade Organization, which requires its members to provide patents
pursuant to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS). 2 An important question, however, is the amount of
flexibility that nations have in framing patentability requirements to
promote their preferred balance of innovation versus health policy.
Specifically, important current issues include what type of innovation
the current industry produces, as well as whether countries should
agree to higher patent standards than TRIPS requires, as repeatedly
requested by the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
In recent years, companies are increasingly seeking and
obtaining a series of patents on different aspects of a drug, with each
patent having a later expiration date to effectively result in a longer
period of market exclusivity. 3 Critics call this "evergreening," in that
the patent term appears "evergreen," even if the commercial
exclusivity is technically achieved through different patents. 4
However, companies that engage in this practice consider this to be
appropriate "lifecycle management" of their products.5 As most
consumers know, patented drugs cost more than generic versions of

faster access to low-cost generic drugs have suggested that the United States follow other
countries in taking a more restrictive approach to patentability of drugs, these views are
definitely in the minority of scholars as well as policy makers. E.g., Tahir Amin & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals:A Case Study of How Patents on
Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286, 2292 (2012) (suggesting
that increased standards of patentability would be the "most effective method to counteract
inappropriate extensions of market exclusivity" and mentioning India law in particular).
See infra note 22.
2.
See infra Part II.C.
3.
4.
E.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40917, PATENT EVERGREENING:
ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1 (2009); Glyn Moody, OxyContin and the Art of

Evergreening, TECHDIRT (Apr.
23,
2013),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130423/
11095922808/oxycontin-art-evergreening.shtml (new version of OxyContin as an example of
evergreening). Although there are different patents involved regarding the same product, some
articles fail to make this distinction. E.g., Priya Shetty, Novartis Challenges India's Patent Law,
NATURE (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.nature.com/news/novartis-challenges-india-spatent-law-1.10262?nc=1337069598293 (defining evergreening as a "practice in which pharma
companies continuously extend the life of a patent by tweaking the drug slightly").
See infra Part II.C.
5.
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initially patented drugs.
Accordingly, if companies obtain more
patents on drugs, costs may increase.
A number of countries have expressed concern about this
development, with some tailoring their patent laws to attempt to
ensure that patent incentives better promote more socially beneficial
innovation. In particular, some countries have excluded certain types
of drugs from the scope of patentable subject matter or have raised
patentability standards on drugs. 6 Countries that are modifying, or
contemplating modifying, their patent laws to restrict what drugs can
be patented are addressing a phenomena that has been well
documented: pharmaceutical companies are obtaining patents on
drugs of limited therapeutic significance that promote their profits at
a substantial social cost.'
While there is global concern about questionable patent
practices of pharmaceutical companies, there is also substantial
discussion and debate concerning patentable subject matter in the
United States. In recent years, there have been several decisions by
the US Supreme Court concerning the scope of patentable subject
matter.8 These cases indicate unrest concerning a traditionally broad
scope of patentable subject matter in the United States.9 Of particular
note is that some things long considered patentable, such as isolated
genes, were recently challenged and, despite concerns that this would
6.

E.g., infra Part III (discussing India and Canada); see also EUROPEAN COMM'N,

PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY FINAL REPORT at 453 (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter EC
PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT]; IP AUSTL., AUSTL. GOV'T, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW:
BACKGROUND AND SUGGESTED ISSUES PAPER 15 (2012).

7.

See Domenico Motola et al., An Update on the First Decade of the European

Centralized Procedure:How Many Innovative Drugs?, 62 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 610, 610

(2006) (concluding that less than a third of drugs were important therapeutic innovations based
on an algorithm); Johan C.F. van Luijn et al., Superior Efficacy of New Medicines?, 66 EUR. J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 445, 445 (2010) (finding only 10 percent of new drugs introduced
between 1999 and 2005 to be clinically superior over existing medicine); Agnes I. Vitry et al.,
Assessment of the Therapeutic Value of New Medicines Marketed in Australia, J.
PHARMACEUTICAL POL'Y & PRAC. 4-5 (2013) (assessing the therapeutic value of medicines in
Australia and finding similar results as the Motola study). In 2014, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved a record number of new drugs, including some important
therapies. E.g., Bernard Munos, 2014 New DrugApprovals Hit 18-Year High, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2015,
1:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmunos/2015/01/02/the-fda-approvals-of-2014; John
Jenkins, CDER Approved Many Innovative Drugs, FDA VOICE (Jan. 14, 2015),
http:/Iblogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2015/01/cder-approved-many-innovative-drugs-in-2014/.
However, it is unclear whether this is an anomaly; moreover, existing patent laws in some
countries may nonetheless still encourage companies to spend more time developing drugs of less
therapeutic significance.
8.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
9.
E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting "anything under the
sun made by man" is patentable).
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upend settled expectations,10 the US Supreme Court did modify
existing law.11
Interestingly, while the United States has recently considered
whether genes and software should be patentable subject matter,
there is virtually no discussion concerning drugs. There are, of course,
some differences in that drug patents are not considered to negatively
impact researchers as much as patents on genes and software-one
gene patent can stifle an entire area of research, and in software, a
thicket of patents may preclude not only research, but also product
development. 12 However, for patients who can ill afford a patented
drug, the policy implications loom large. 13
10.
E.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("DNA inventions excluded from the broad scope of § 101 [is] contrary
to the settled expectation of the inventing and investing communities . . . .").
Myriad, 113 S. Ct. at 2119. Arguably, the decision does not substantially modify the
11.
commercial marketplace by denying patents only on some types of genes, but the fact that there
was a challenge in the first instance to seemingly settled law for decades is nonetheless
significant. In addition, since that decision, the Australian Supreme Court has come to a
different conclusion concerning patentability of genes. DArcy v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. [2014]
FCAFC 115 paras. 195, 207 (upholding validity of Myriad's patent over isolated gene sequences
and expressly rejecting the approach of the US Supreme Court).
12.

See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR

THE 21ST CENTURY 71-77 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (noting concern about the impact
of patents on biotechnology); Stu Woolman et al., Evidence of Patent Thickets in Complex
Biopharmaceutical Technologies, 53 IDEA 3 (2013); RICHARD STALLMAN, Software PatentsObstacles to Software Development, in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF

RICHARD M. STALLMAN (2d. ed. 2010). However, others suggest that these concerns are
overstated. E.g., David Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERK.
TECH. L.J. 986 (2005).
13.
E.g., Robyn Tamblyn et al., The Incidence and Determinants of Primary
Nonadherence with Prescribed Medication in Primary Care, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 441
(2014); see also Angela Townsend, Ignoring Doctor's Orders: Not Filling New Prescription Is
Common Patient Habit, Study Shows, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 1, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.cleveland.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2014/04/ignoring-doctors orders-not filling-new-pr
escriptionisscommon-patienthabit_study-shows.html
(discussing recent study); Sluggish
Economy Forces Americans to Cut Corners to Pay for Medications: Those Without Prescription
Drug
Coverage
Nearing
Crisis
Point,
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG
(Sept.
2012),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/09/sluggish-economy-forces-americans-to-cut-cornersto-pay-for-medications/index.htm. In addition, although recent health care reform may have
expanded coverage of prescriptions, since almost 20 percent of insurance plans before the
Affordable Care Act did not include any prescription coverage, out of pocket costs for drugs may
still remain high, even though there is some coverage. See MILLIMAN, INC., IMPACT OF THE
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE ON PARTICIPANT COST SHARING FOR PHARMACY BENEFITS

(2014), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/milliman-impact-of-hix-onpharmacy-benefits-report.pdf (prepared for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA)); Mary Agnes Carey, Castellani: Health Law's Cost-Sharing Could Limit
Patient Access to Prescription Drugs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS BLOG (May 7, 2014),
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/castellani-health-laws-cost-sharing-could-limit-patient-accessto-prescription-drugs/; Key Coleman, Drug Coverage & the Affordable Care Act: 34% Increase in
Drug Copayments and Co-InsuranceFees Compared to Pre-Reform Market, HEALTHPOCKET (Feb.
13, 2014), http://www.healthpocket.com/healtheare-research/infostat/prescription-drug-coverageand-affordable-care-act#.U4tZEV5WdhP.
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Even if drug patents may not have the same negative
implications on research as genes and software, reconsidering whether
there is a sound policy for extending a broad scope of patentable
subject matter or other aspects of patentability for drugs is timely and
appropriate. In addition to self-interested companies, some scholars
have recently argued for more expansive protection of drugs.1 4 The
arguments are often couched as necessary to promote pharmaceutical
innovation because, despite exponential increases in the amount of
money spent on research and development, there has been no
corollary increase in new drugs; rather, innovation has generally been
stagnant for years. 15 These arguments also come at a time when the
patents on many "blockbuster" drugs, each of which generates over $1
billion in sales, are expiring. 16 Thus, the drug industry may be
14.
E.g., Shamnad Basheer, The Invention of an Investment Incentive for
PharmaceuticalInnovation, 15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 305, 305 (2012); Burk & Lemley, supra
note 1, at 1616-17; Dana P. Goldman, The Benefits From Giving Makers of Conventional "Small
Molecule" Drugs Longer Exclusivity Over Clinical Data, 30 HEALTH AFF. 84, 89 (2011); Henry
Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand Name and Generic Drug Competition May Warrant a Revision
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2157, 2164 (2011); Christopher Holman,
Unpredictabilityin Patent Law and Its Effect on PharmaceuticalInnovation, 76 Mo. L. REV. 646,
684 (2011); Roin, supra note 1, at 557; see also Emily Mochiko Morris, The Myth of Generic
&

PharmaceuticalCompetition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

ENT. L.J. 245, 268 (2012) (suggesting that existing law fails to adequately promote brand name
companies and that they need greater protection due to generic competition).
15.

See, e.g., DELOITTE, MEASURING THE RETURN FROM INNOVATION: Is R&D EARNING

ITS INVESTMENT? 6-9

(2011),

available at http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/science/

pdf/1sfMeasuringReturn-fromPharmaInnovation.pdf;
JEFF HEWITT ET AL., BEYOND THE
SHADOW OF A DROUGHT: THE NEED FOR A NEW MINDSET IN PHARMA R&D 3-4 (2011); PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION
IN DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVALUATION 9-10 (2012); Michael Lanthier et al., An

Improved Approach to Measuring Drug Innovation Finds Steady Rates of First-In-Class
Pharmaceuticals, 1987-2011, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1433, 1433 (2013) (noting the "sluggish" pace of
new molecular entity (NME) approvals since 2000 and concern about the industry output given
greatly increased research and development); Bernard Munos, The FDA Approvals of 2013: A
Watershed?, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmunos/
2014/01/03/the-fda-approvals-of-2013-a-watershed (noting that the average output from large
pharmaceutical companies in the last five years is not enough to support current sales); see also
Ernst R. Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns From New Drugs Raises Questions About
Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 245 (2015) (concluding that current rewards are
inadequate to sustain innovation in light of diminished financial return on drugs).
16.
See, e.g., TONY HARRIS ET AL., IP AUSTL., AUSTL. GOV'T, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
REVIEW REPORT 2013, at 36 (2013) [hereinafter AUSTL. PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT] (citing Jack

DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirationsand the "PatentCliff," U.S. PHARMACIST
GENERIC DRUG REV. SUPPLEMENT 12 (2012)), available at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.aulpdfs/

2013-05-27PPR_.FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN REPORT]; Ajoy Bera & Ashish
Mukherjee, The Importance of Generic Drugs in India, 2 INT'L J. PHARM., CHEM. & BIOLOGICAL
Sci. 575, 578 (2012) (providing chart of blockbuster drugs gone off patent in 2011-2012);
Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 12, 12-13
(2011); Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug Costs Dropped in 2012, but Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19fbusiness/use-of-generics-produces-an-unusual-dropin-drug-spending.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 (noting the "patent cliff" with respect to
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particularly motivated to seek more protection either by maximizing
benefits from existing laws or by modifying laws to obtain more
protection. These arguments may sway policy makers; indeed,
legislators have enacted regulatory protection for some types of drugs
that are considered by the industry to provide protection of equal
In addition,
importance to patents for commercial products."
Congress just issued a legislative discussion document that proposes
These
even more regulatory protection to promote innovation.1 8
arguments are likely to be particularly relevant in the near future as
drug companies, as well as some scholars, note that profits are eroding
due to competition from generic companies, stricter and more
expensive regulatory requirements, product liability suits for injuries
resulting from the products of generic companies, and allegedly
increased costs of drug development.19
blockbuster drugs such as Lipitor and Plavix that lost patent protection in recent years).
Branded drugs with annual sales of $32.2 billion in 2011 lost patent protection in 2012, leaving
those revenues exposed to cheap generics. EVALUATEPHARMA, BIOTECH AND PHARMA 2012 YEAR
IN REVIEW 20 (2013), available at http://info.evaluatepharma.com/rs/evaluatepharmaltd/
images/EPVReview_2012.pdf; see Cynthia Koons, Lilly Misses Estimates as Patent Expirations
Cut Sales, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 23, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-1023/lilly-misses-estimates-as-patent-expirations-cut-sales.html (noting that it is facing a wave of
patent expirations on top-selling treatments).
17.
21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 801 (2012) (exclusivity to promote more development of
antibiotics); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012) (twelve-year term for biologics); see also RANDALL
MORIN ET AL., ADOPT IP PROTECTIONS TO ENSURE REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY FOR ORPHAN
DRUGS, Assoc. OF CORP. COUNSEL 82-86 (2013) (discussing the interplay of the Investigational
New Drug Program, regulatory exclusivity, and patent protection).
18.
21ST CENTURY DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, 114TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TO ACCELERATE
THE DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND DELIVERY OF 21ST CENTURY CURES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.
house.gov/files/1 14/Analysis/Cures/20150127-Cures-Discussion-Document.pdf; see also THE 21ST
CENTURY CURES DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/files/1 14/FINAL%20Cures%2ODiscussion%20D
ocument%20White%20Paper.pdf; Kurt R. Karst, House Energy & Commerce Committee Releases
21 Century Cures Act Discussion Draft; The Nearly 400-Page Bill Includes More Proposals Than
You can Shake a Stick At!, FDA L. BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
fdalaw -blog-hyman-phelps/2015/0 1/house-energy-commerce-committee-releases-2 1-centurycures-act-discussion-draft-the-nearly-400-page-b.html.
19.
E.g., Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand Name and Generic Drug
Competition, J. MED. ECON. 1 (2013) (increased erosion of sales due to generic competition);
Victor Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines
When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1835 (2013) (increased costs from products liability suits against generic products); Neeraj
Sood, The Effect of Regulation on PharmaceuticalRevenue: Experience in Nineteen Countries, 10
HEALTH AFF. 136 (2009) (regulatory requirements reduce revenues); Cost to Develop and Win
Marketing Approval for a New Drug is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS CENTER STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov.
18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edulnews/complete-story/pr-tufts-csdd 2014_cost.study (suggesting
increased regulatory costs). Although the latest estimate of cost development allegedly showing
costs has doubled over the past decade, some have been critical of the study and noted that it
likely suffers from similar flaws in earlier estimates. E.g., Aaron Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop
a Drug? New Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014),
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This Article aims to illustrate that the dominant US approach
need not be the only approach and that, at a minimum, different
approaches to the patentability of drugs are in fact permissible under
international law and do have policy justifications. Since this Article
is part of a symposium on patentable subject matter, this Article, of
course, addresses whether some drugs can be excluded from the scope
of patentable subject matter. However, because patentable subject
matter is only one policy lever to address perceived problems with
pharmaceutical patents, this Article does not restrict its focus to this
single issue. 20 Most importantly, this Article aims to show that not
only developing countries, but also developed countries may approach
the patent eligibility of drugs differently and that these approaches
are in fact permissible under international law. 2 1
This Article proceeds in three parts. After this Introduction,
Part II provides some fundamental background to drug development
and marketing, including the role of patent protection. Part II also
highlights problems that have been noted with the existing model of
drug development, as well as how companies have used patent laws in
conjunction with other mechanisms in questionable ways. Part III
then provides a comparative perspective on how India and Canada
have modified their patent laws to limit patents on drugs when doing
so seems necessary to best promote the balance between innovation
and access to affordable medicine. Part IV then evaluates the extent
to which the Indian and Canadian patent provisions are permissible
under TRIPS. This Part begins with an introduction to TRIPS and
how it should be interpreted, before explaining why the approaches of
both countries are in fact permissible, contrary to what some have
suggested. This Part concludes by considering policy implications of
these unusual laws, as well as possible additional related avenues for
exploration.
II. BACKGROUND
To best understand the unique patent approaches in India and
Canada and whether they are good policy, it is important to first
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-costs-of-developing-a-newdrug.html?abt=0002&abg=1; Robert Weisman, Cost of Bringing Drug to Market Tops $2.5b,
Research Finds, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.comfbusiness/2014/11/
18/cost-bringing-prescription-drug-market-tops-billion-tufts-research-center-estimates/6mPph8
maRxzcvftWjr7HUN/story.html. Nonetheless, this study will likely be relied upon to justify more
protection.
20.
This is especially true because sometimes it is unclear whether a given law is
limiting the scope of patentable subject matter, or instead, suggesting a heightened novelty or
nonobviousness standard. See infra Part III.A (discussing India).
21.
See infra Part IV.
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address some fundamentals.
Accordingly, this Part explains the
basics of patent law and policy as well as how they intersect with drug
development and marketing. The final section of this Part addresses a
concern of some countries and commentators that multinational
pharmaceutical companies are manipulating existing laws in a way
that fails to promote drug innovation, while impeding access to
affordable drugs.
A. Patent Law and Policy-Domestic and International
A patent is a legal document granted by a specific country to an
inventor that provides the commercially valuable ability to exclude
others from the patented invention within the boundaries of the
patent-granting country. 22 There is no patent right unless and until a
nation decides to grant a patent in response to a patent application
that meets domestic patentability requirements. 23
Traditionally, patents have involved a balance of competing
policy interests. Since patents generally result in a cost increase for
the patented item, granting a patent is only a reasonable policy if
there is a countervailing social policy that is promoted. The earliest
patents were granted to promote technology transfer; a patent was
granted to inventors willing to move to the patent-granting territory
to not only use their invention there, but also teach others how to use
it.24 Today, patents are predominantly considered a way to promote
domestic innovation, even though technology transfer is sometimes
mentioned. 25 Although patents may arguably promote technology

22.
E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 ILM 1143 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] art. 28; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
23.
Patent law is unique in this regard-all other types of intellectual property rights
(trademark, copyright, and trade secrets) can exist in the United States without a formal
application. E.g., LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCoTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw:

CASES & MATERIALS 123-24 (Semaphore Press 2014).
24.

E.g., CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A

CRITICAL HISTORY 53 (2006). This technology transfer principle was so important that an early
international agreement acknowledged that patent rights could be forfeited without proper use
of the patent in the country; this was later softened by permitting patent owners to keep patents,
but mandate a compulsory license if the owner was not utilizing the patent within the country.
E.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 303.
25.
See, e.g., Licensing and Technology Transfer, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/licensing.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
("[T]he transfer of technology is a major pillar that supports the raison d'itre of the patent
system."); see also LOREN & MILLER, supra note 23, at 123-24.
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transfer for developing countries, 26 most commentators consider
patents to be predominantly a way to promote domestic innovation. 27
The patentability requirements can be seen as ensuring that
patents fulfill their social policy goals. For example, courts have
frequently considered patents to be a type of social contract-for the
social "cost" of a patent in terms of the higher prices that result on
patented inventions, the patentee must adequately disclose
information concerning the patented invention, including how to make
and use it, such that society will benefit from the invention. 28 In other
words, although an inventor could keep an invention secret, the
reward of a patent is, in part, given to induce disclosure of information
to society so that others can learn from and build upon that
innovation. Because most inventions build upon prior inventions,
encouraging inventors to share their knowledge can be socially
valuable, even if there is a temporary cost of higher prices during the
period of patent protection.
The social harm of higher prices on patented goods is mediated
by both the patent term and patentability requirements. Patents are
26.
See Rachel Diamant et al., Promoting Technology Transfer in Developing Countries:
Lessons from Public-PrivatePartnershipsin the Field of Pharmaceuticals, in THE STOCKHOLM
NETWORK EXPERTS' SERIES ON PHARMACEUTICAL IPRS 8 (2007). However, evidence indicates that

technology transfer only happens for mid-level developing countries and not the poorest ones. See
Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, The Role of Patent Protection in (Clean/Green)
Technology Transfer, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 487, 521 (2010) (noting that
stronger patents have little effect on technology transfer to the lowest income countries).
27.
See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) ("Congress has passed a series of
patent laws that grant certain exclusive rights over certain inventions and discoveries as a
means of encouraging innovation."); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PATENTS AND
INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 9 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/

&

science/sci-tech/24508541.pdf. This is definitely true for industrialized countries and some assert
that it is also applicable for poor countries, although evidence suggests that countries must be at
a certain level of economic sufficiency before patents can in fact promote domestic innovation.
E.g., Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting
Environment?, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 436, 436 (2007). Even among industrialized countries,
studies do not convincingly show that stronger patent protection results in more innovation. E.g.,
Lee G. Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation?
Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reform, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77 (2001) (no
increased innovation after strengthened Japanese patent laws); Josh Lerner, Patent Protection
and Innovation Over 150 Years, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 221, 221-25 (2002). The pharmaceutical
industry, however, has generally been noted as the exception. Yet, some continue to believe this,
perhaps in part because of studies that show correlations between stronger levels of patent
protection and innovation, even though correlation is not the same as causation. E.g., W.G. Park
& D. Lippoldt, Technology Transfer and the Economic Implications of the Strengthening of
Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries 5 (OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No.
62, 2008) (finding that stronger levels of patent protection are positively and significantly
associated with inflows of high tech product and expenditures on R&D); Elizabeth Webster
Paul H. Jensen, Do Patents Matter for Commercialization?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 341, 341 (2001). This
could be because of a strong belief in the patent system. Ho, supra note 1, at 425-26.
28.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 163-65 (1989);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974).
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generally awarded a limited term of protection of less than twenty
years in order to minimize the period during which consumers must
pay patent-inflated prices. 29 In addition, patentability requirements
are intended to restrict the harm of higher prices to deserving
inventions.
There are two basic types of requirements that patent
applications must meet to persuade a national patent office that a
patent is deserved.
First, the invention must meet certain
requirements; typically, the invention must be patentable subject
matter and also be useful, new, and nonobvious. 30 Second, even if the
invention is patent-worthy, a patent may still be denied if the inventor
fails to properly disclose important aspects of the invention that are
considered part of the social bargain of the disclosure noted above. 31
Both of the requirements on patentability and disclosure are intended
to ensure that the social harm of higher prices is limited to situations
where society would most benefit, justifying the burden of a patent.
A traditional feature of patents, similar to all types of
intellectual property, is that they are territorially limited. Patents. are
awarded by individual nations and patent rights are generally only
enforceable against infringements that occur within that nation.
Moreover, a patent granted by one country does not guarantee that
another country will grant a patent; this is a fundamental principle
that has been consistently recognized in international agreements
governing patent protection. 32 This is consistent with the fact that
patents are policy tools and that not all countries will necessarily
agree on when the negative short-term costs of patents are considered
worthwhile.
A fundamental patent requirement is that an invention be
patentable subject matter. If an invention is not patentable subject
matter, there is no need to consider whether it meets the technical
requirements of being new, useful, or nonobvious, since failure to
29.
The patent term in most countries is a function of how long patent offices take to
examine the patent and calculated to end twenty years from the first filing, such that it is always
shorter than twenty years. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (noting that the term begins on the
date the patent issues and ends twenty years from the date of the relevant patent application).
Although this term may seem lengthy, it is far shorter than copyright terms that last seventy
years beyond the life of the author or the potentially infinite terms available for trade secrets
and trademarks. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (copyright term); Melvin F. Jager, 1979 Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, in 3 TRADE SECRETS LAW, app. Al; 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:17.50 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that trademarks have a

potentially unlimited duration).
30.
E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2012).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
31.
32.
E.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 24, art.
4bis (granting of patent in one country does not impact whether another country must grant a
patent).
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satisfy one element of patentability will bar a patent. 33 Like all other
patentability requirements, the patentable subject matter standard is
a policy decision. The doctrine of patentable subject matter may
preclude things that are indeed new to society, yet deemed
undeserving of patent protection. For example, most countries will
not patent a newly discovered, yet naturally occurring, phenomena
because although newly discovered, the person that discovered it did
not create anything. 34 Similarly, many countries-but not the United
States-bar patents on inventions that would be contrary to
morality. 35
One traditional exclusion from patentable subject matter for
many countries was an exclusion of drug and drug components
because the higher cost of patented drugs would limit access to
affordable medicine. However, countries that barred patents on drugs
often still permitted patents on the methods of making drugs.
Permitting only methods, but not products-such as an active
ingredient of a drug-to be patented, has important consequences.
When the drug or active ingredient is itself patented, no one else can
make the identical compound, such that a patent can enable the
manufacturer to charge a premium. On the other hand, a patent on
only the process of making the drug does not block others from
developing different methods of making the same drug. Moreover, if
there are multiple manufacturers of the identical drug, such
competition effectively lowers prices.
Contrary to what the pharmaceutical industry often suggests,
countries that provide patentability standards on drugs that are
different from the United States are not all doing so simply because
they fail to value innovation and intend to free-ride off of the United

33.
35 U.S.C. § 101. Of course, whether patentable subject matter is considered before
other patent requirements is currently subject to scholarly debate. E.g., Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2011) ("Indeed, we agree with a number of
commentators that the right time to apply § 101 is as a backstop after all other validity doctrines
have been exhausted.").
34.
E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012) ("The Court has long held that . . . '[1]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas' are not patentable." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))). Of course, if
the natural item is modified from its natural form, patent protection is possible. For example,
one landmark patent case found that genetically modified bacteria designed to help clean oil
spills were patentable, even though bacteria are naturally occurring. Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
35.
E.g., TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 27(2); Convention on the Grant of European Patents
art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 (1974). In the United States, it is permissible to patent
something for use in an illegal activity, such as gambling. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang,
Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Not only is it not excluded from the scope of
patentable subject matter, but the United States has also abandoned a prior doctrine that
required an invention's use to be a moral one. E.g., id. at 1366-67.
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States. Rather, countries at all levels of development have barred
patents on drugs because of the policy concern that patented drugs
unduly impede access to affordable medicine. Some industrialized
countries only began to patent drugs long after the United States
did, 36 and often as a result of outside forces; for example, Switzerland
and Italy only did so in the late 1970s, due to external pressure.3 7 In
addition, even countries that granted patents on drugs sometimes
required that patent owners permit others to make the patented drug
under a "compulsory license" to ensure that they would be available at
affordable prices.3 8
Today, over one hundred countries must provide patent
protection for drugs, and not just methods of making drugs, as
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is because all
WTO members must comply with TRIPS, the WTO side agreement
that requires certain "minimum" standards of patent protection. 39
An important issue is that although most countries must now
provide patents on drugs, there is not necessarily broad consensus
that doing so is good social policy. The idea of including the first
international substantive standards of patent protection was the
brainchild of US companies, including the pharmaceutical industry. 4 0

36.
E.g., Dickerson v. Maurer, 108 F. 233 (E.D. Pa 1901) (rejecting claim that patent
was invalid as not new, but never questioning that patent on new chemical product was
patentable subject matter), affd, Maurer v. Dickerson, 113 F. 870 (3d Cir. 1902).
37.

E.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 245

(2008) (noting that Italy introduced patents on drugs in 1978 under pressure from foreign
multinationals); Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development:
Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUMAN DEV. 287, 291 (2001) (noting that
Switzerland began to provide patents on drugs in response to threat of trade sanctions from
Germany).

38.
E.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 37, at 249 (noting that the 1907 English patent
act introduced mandatory licenses for medicine). Canada also previously required drugs to be
subject to compulsory licenses. See infra Part III.B (discussing Canada).
39.
TRIPS, supra note 22. However, WTO member countries that are designated "Least
Developed Countries" by the UN have been given an extension of time to implement patent
protection for drugs. Id. art. 66(1). Originally, the date was 2006 (ten-year transition period),
which was then extended in 2001 until 2016. Id; World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755, 1 7 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration]. The
current date is 2021. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Extension of
the Transition Period Under Article 66. 1 for Least Developed Country Members: Decision of the
Council for TRIPS of 11 June 2013, IP/C/64 1 1 (June 12, 2013); see also Arno Hold & Bryan
Christopher Mercurio, After the Second Extension of the Transition Period for LDCs: How Can
the WTO GraduallyIntegrate the Poorest Countries into TRIPS? 4 (Nat'l Ctr. of Competence in
Research on Trade Regulation, Working Paper No. 2013/42, 2013), available at
http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user-upload/nccrtrade.ch/wp3/HoldMercurioWorkingPaper 2013-42jinal_2013-07-28.pdf.
40.
E.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7-8 (2003).
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Including patent protection, and especially patents on drugs, was
always a controversial issue that some countries, such as India,
objected to. Before TRIPS was concluded, there were nearly fifty
countries that did not provide patents on drugs. 4 1 These countries
likely agreed to patent standards because of non-patent issues, such
as trade benefits for their exports under the WTO. 4 2
Since the
patentability standards were likely not a reflection of consensus on
proper policy, it is perhaps not surprising that a major interpretive
issue with TRIPS is the extent to which nations have flexibility in
deciding what aspects of drugs are patentable, as will be further
discussed in Part IV.
B. Drug Development and the Role of Patents
Most consumers are aware that there are two different types of
prescription drugs-expensive brand name drugs versus cheaper
generic drugs. The difference in cost between generic and brand name
patented drugs is a function of patent law.4 3 Patented drugs can
command a premium price because patents legally entitle their owner
to exclude all others from making or selling the patented invention
during the patent term. 44
Drug companies often point to development costs in justifying
the high cost of patented drugs. To sell a drug, a company must
provide substantial clinical data from both animals and humans to
show that a new drug is safe and effective to a domestic regulatory
agency, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the

41.
SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA'S PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY: PATENT
PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 59 (2005) (citing Julio J. Nogues, Social Costs

and Benefits of Introducing Patent Protection for PharmaceuticalDrugs in Developing Countries,
31 DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 83 (1990)).

42.
This is a prevailing view, but not the only view. Other views are that countries were
coerced, or that they did not realize what they were getting into. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS
and its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79 (2006) (describing four different
narratives to explain the origins and conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement).
43.
In some countries, the difference may be mediated in a variety of ways, such as
imposing caps on what companies can charge or negotiating in bulk for deep discounts. However,
because the United States does not do any of these on a large-scale basis, the United States
accounts for nearly half of global sales. E.g., CYNTHIA M. Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 26 (2011)
[hereinafter HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE].

44.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Of course, although competition generally results in lower
cost generic prices, recently the cost of some generic drugs has increased. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Rosenthal, Rapid Price Increases of Some Generic Drugs Catch Users by Surprise, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/health/some-generic-drug-prices-aresoaring.html. This, however, is a notable exception that occurs only if competition lessens,
whereas patented drugs are generally always expensive since, by definition, they are legally sold
only by the patent owner-unless others are licensed. Id.
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United States. 45 However, even before the multi-year clinical testing
can begin, 46 it may take years to identify any promising chemical
compounds in the lab. 4 7 Most initially promising chemicals fail before
animal testing begins and even many drugs tested in humans may fail
to make it to the market because of problems with efficacy or safety.
The industry suggests that only one in eight to ten thousand lab
tested compounds eventually reaches the marketplace. 48 Accordingly,
companies assert that the sale of commercial products must also cover
the expense of investigating the many compounds that fail to reach
the marketplace.
In contrast, a generic drug has an abbreviated path to market
for a small fraction of the time and cost. 4 9 The time and expenses for
generic companies are substantially abbreviated not only because they
do not need to invest in research, but also because regulatory agencies
will generally grant approval for generic drugs based on an expedited
procedure that requires a much more limited set of clinical data than
required for new drugs.50 The proposed generic drug only needs to
have testing that shows it is "bioequivalent" to the previously
approved brand drug, allowing an agency to infer that the earlier
clinical tests of safety and efficacy of the brand drug also apply to the
generic.5 1 In addition, brand companies note that while they must
incur marketing costs, generics do no marketing and simply copy
commerically succcessful drugs, for which the brand companies have
already created a market. 52
45.
See FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 6.
46.
Salomeh Keyhani et al., Are Development Times for PharmaceuticalsIncreasing or
Decreasing?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 461, 463 (2007) (reporting an average of five years of clinical
testing, with a range of 1.4 to 14.6 years).
47.
See FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 6-7.
48.
PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 16.
49.
E.g., INT'L FED'N PHARM. MFRS. & Ass'NS, ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG
DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 6-7 (2000) (estimating $1 million); Henry G.

&

Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
439, 443 (2007) (estimating in the low end of a $2 million to $200 million scale). In contrast,
estimates for the cost of a new drug are substantially higher. E.g., Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G.
Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different, 28 MANAGERIAL
DECISION ECON. 469, 477 (2007) (finding over $500 million in out-of-pocket costs); see also Tufts
Center for the Study of Drug Development, supra note 19 (press release alleging current out-ofpocket costs of over $1,300 million according to a currently unpublished study). The differential
may sometimes appear greater because the industry has repeatedly represented the "average"
cost of all drugs to be an inflated figure that only represents the most expensive minority of
drugs that are developed. See Ho, supra note 1, at 456-57 (explaining cost "schema").
50.
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (j)(4)(F) (2012)
(addressing new drug and bioequivalence, respectively); 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a)(1) (2014)
(regarding generic drugs).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
51.
52.

E.g., FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, at 9.
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It is widely recognized that the pharmaceutical industry is
unique among most industries in that patents are considered
essential. Whereas issues such as first-mover advantage are more
important in other industries, patents are critical to the success of a
pharmaceutical company. 53 In addition, patented drugs are also
different from most patented products in that they are expensive and
time-consuming to develop, but easy to copy. 5 4

Because a patent permits a company to legally exclude all
others from making or selling the identical drug,5 5 pharmaceutical

companies mostly rely on patents to protect their investment in new
drugs and to maintain a competitive advantage.5 6 Of course,
competitors may sell a drug that aims to treat the same condition;
however, the ability to exclude others from making the identical
patented drug generally permits the patent-owning company to sell its
drug at a substantial premium. This is true even when there are two
or more drugs that treat the same condition in the same way; each
drug is usually priced at a substantial premium in contrast to a
generic drug. 7 In other words, even when a new drug is only an
incremental innovation with no therapeutic benefit over existing
drugs, it may still cost just as much as similar drugs. There is
generally no substantial reduction in price unless and until there are
multiple generic drugs on the market.5 8 Moreover, the premium cost
53.

See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial

Research and Development, in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783, 796 (Martin

Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1987); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An
Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 (1986); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or
Not) 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
54.
E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT

IT 42-43 (2004) (noting that, unlike a business that builds a new factory, a pharmaceutical
business is building an intangible asset that is easier to steal).

§ 271

55.

35 U.S.C.

56.

See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 35-36.

(2012).

57.
Although patented drugs may cost somewhat less when there are more drugs in the
same class, so long as a drug is under patent protection, it still sells for much more than a
generic version. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 14-15 (1998),

available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.
One
study noted discounts of "at least 5%" for some drugs, but no discounts at all for one drug.
JOSEPH A. DIMASI, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRICE TRENDS FOR PRESCRIPTION

PHARMACEUTICALS: 1995-1999, tbl.4 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugpapers/dimassildimasi-final.htm. For example, in the popular category of proton pump
inhibitors, each of three patent protected drugs cost about four or five dollars a day whereas a
generic version costs only about a dollar a day. Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Recent Economic
Trends in American Pharmacy, 51 AM. INST. HIST. PHARMACY 103, 123 (2009).
58.
See, e.g., Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW
ENG. J. MED 1993, 1995 (2007) (indicating that average price drops to 94 percent of original with
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of a patented drug has been increasing-whereas a patented drug was
roughly twice the cost of generics in 1990, by 2008, the differential had
doubled, such that branded drugs may cost roughly four times the cost
of a generic.5 9
Although consumers may view drugs as either expensive
patented drugs or cheap generics, from a developmental cost
perspective, newly patented drugs are far from identical.
In
particular, while pharmaceutical companies tend to suggest that every
drug has a long and expensive pathway to the commercial market,
this is, in fact, only true for a minority of new drugs that are "new
molecular entities." The new molecules take longer to develop but are
more likely to result in treatments that are dramatically different.
For example, the new Hepatitis C drug sold as Sovaldi is a new
molecular entity and, for the first time ever, offers a cure to the
disease. However, most new drugs are incremental modifications of
previously developed drugs; drugs sold as "new" may be incremental
modifications of existing drugs such as a different dosage or a different
form of administration.6 0 Although an incremental modification may
be of some clinical benefit, these are notably easier and less expensive
to develop; 6 1 one estimate suggests that the cost of development is only
a quarter of the cost of the most expensive drugs (based on new
molecular entities).
When patent law realities are combined with regulatory
realities and rational business decisions, all considerations point
towards a focus on incremental drugs. 62 First, patent laws provide the
a single generic, but to 52 percent with two manufacturers, and also noting that price drops to a
third or lower of original when there are five or more generics); David Reiffen & Michael Ward,
Generic Drug Industry Dynamics 1 (U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Working Paper No. 248, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.govfbe/workpapers/industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf (suggesting that
eight competitors are necessary for significant price drops).
59.
See, e.g., Schondelmeyer, supra note 57, at 106. Although this has traditionally been
true, in recent years, the price of generics has increased significantly-including some tripledigit price hikes-and unexpectedly, to the extent that Congress and the Department of Justice
are now focusing on this issue. E.g., David Lazarus, What's Behind the Huge Price Jump for
Some Generic Drugs?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014, 6:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lafi-lazarus-20141021-column.html; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Lawmakers Look for Ways to Provide
Relief for Rising Cost of Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2014, at A17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/lawmakers-look-for-ways-to-provide-relief-for-rising-costof-generic-drugs.html; Ed Silverman, Justice Department Probes Generic Companies After Price
Hike Report, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2014/11/
10/justice-department-probes-generic-competition-after-price-hike-reports/.
60.
See Ho, supra note 1, at 426.
61.
See FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, at 8.
62.
There are of course other potential factors that impact drug development that are
unrelated to the patent focus of this symposium, such as what insurance companies or Medicare
are likely to reimburse, that could potentially also impact innovation. However, discussion of
these issues is beyond the focus of this Article.
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same term of protection for all drugs without regard to whether the
drug is an important clinical breakthrough or an incremental drug of
little therapeutic importance. 63 In addition, some types of incremental
innovations may also be able to rely on earlier clinical data to obtain
regulatory approval for sale and thus substantially limit the usual
time and cost to develop a truly new drug. 6 4 Accordingly, a rational
profit-maximizing company would logically seek to focus on
incremental inventions. 65 In fact, that is the case. During the 1990s
more than half of applications for "new" drugs were incremental
innovations that utilized known active ingredients.6 6 In addition,
studies of pharmaceutical innovation in the United States, Australia,
and Europe all found most new drugs were incremental innovations 6 7
and that only between 10 and 30 percent of drugs were more
therapeutically valuable than existing drugs. 68

63.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (providing patent term for all inventions). In addition,
although the term may be extended in some cases, including for drugs, there is no adjustment of
patent terms based on the importance or value of the invention. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2012) (providing patent term extension). In addition, simply providing a shorter patent term for
less innovative drugs may not be possible because of international obligations that require a
minimum patent term for all inventions. TRIPS, supranote 22, art. 33.
64.
21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(F)(ii) (2012). Such drugs could be metabolites, polymorphs, or
chiral switching. E.g., Rebecca S. Yoshitani et al., PharmaceuticalReformulation: The Growth of
Life Cycle Management, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POLY 379, 389 (2007). Although there is limited
data on the cost of such drug development, one figure suggests that it is about 30 percent. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21 (2006)

[hereinafter CBO STUDY] (citing Richard G. Frank, New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22
J. HEALTH ECON. 325, 327 (2003), as well as CMR International's 2002 estimate that product line
extensions account for 30 percent of R&D, and PhRMA's 1999 estimate that they account for
"about 18 percent" of R&D expenditures).
65.
This does not mean that incremental innovations have no value; however, this class
of inventions is more likely to have issues, as discussed in the next section.
66.
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDAs
APPROVED IN CALENDAR YEARS 1990-2004 BY THERAPEUTIC POTENTIALS AND CHEMICAL TYPES
(2005); see also INT'L FED'N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS'NS, INCREMENTAL INNOVATION: ADAPTING TO

PATIENT NEEDS 11 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/
Publication/2013/IFPMAIncrementalInnovationFeb_2013Low-Res.pdf
(noting that the
majority of global launches of new drugs from 2005 to the present were incremental products).
67.
E.g., NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., CHANGING PATTERNS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 9 (2002); COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION
AND PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 131

(2006). See also Michael Lanthier et al., An Improved Approach to Measuring Drug Innovation
Finds Steady Rates of First-In-ClassPharmaceuticals, 1987-2011, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1433, 1433
(2013) (noting the "sluggish" pace of NME approvals since 2000 and concern about the industry
output given greatly increased research and development).
See sources cited supra note 7.
68.
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C. Current Concerns with Drug Patents
This Section focuses on a few dominant recent strategies used
by companies to maintain market exclusivity of drugs, such as
"secondary (later issued) patents," as a backdrop for the discussion of
Indian and Canadian laws that seem to address these issues.
Companies use a number of strategies to maximize potential revenue
in each country with somewhat different patent and regulatory laws. 6 9
Given the focus of this Article on evaluating different patent
approaches by these companies, this Section aims to highlight some
patent issues. 70
1. Secondary (And Sometimes Sequential) Patents
Although companies have traditionally protected their drugs
with a single patent on the active ingredient, in recent years,
companies have obtained "secondary" patents on different aspects of a
single commercial drug after obtaining an initial patent on the active
ingredient. Secondary patents may cover peripheral features such as
a tablet coating, an intermediate product that naturally results after
ingesting the drug, or methods of use; it could also include a different
dosage or delivery route.7 1
This practice can be considered a creative way to address the
problem of shorter patent terms for drug patents as compared to other
patented products; whereas most patents have an average patent term

69.
An additional complicating factor is that different terms may refer to the same
strategy. For example, stockpiling, layering, line-extension, reformulation, or product hopping
have been used to reference what is also sometimes called evergreening. See generally Rajarshi
Banerjee, The Success of, and Response to, India's Law Against Patent Layering, 54 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 204 (2013); Michael Enzo Furrow, Analyzing the Laws, Regulations, and Policies Affecting
FDA-Regulated Products: PharmaceuticalPatent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex,
63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 276 (2008); Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product
Hopping in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008). Moreover, some of the
terminology is used inconsistently. For example, those critical of the industry sometimes use the
term "life cycle management" to refer to marketing strategies, whereas the industry usually uses
it to refer to a patent filing strategy.
70.
However, there are many strategies, including some non-legal means, such as
questioning the quality or efficacy of generics, enhancing brand loyalty, settlement with generics,
pricing strategies, and switching to over-the-counter products. The issues are so extensive that
the preliminary European Union (EU) report on problems in the pharmaceutical industry with
respect to reduced innovative drugs and delayed entry of generic drugs solely in the EU has over
400 pages. EUROPEAN COMM'N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY PRELIMINARY REPORT (2008).

71.
Some of these patents should never be issued. For example, an intermediate product
that naturally occurs after ingesting a drug should be invalid under the inherency doctrine. E.g.,
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Companies nonetheless
have a strategy of seeking many secondary patents, including patents on inventions that are not
likely valid.

314

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 17:2:295

of about seventeen years,7 2 the "effective" patent term of drugs is often
only eleven to twelve years. 73 Technically, all patents have the same
basic patent term, but because the owner of a patented drug cannot
sell the drug until regulatory approval has been granted showing it is
safe and effective, which generally occurs after the patent is issued,
the effective term for patents is shorter than for most other products. 74
Secondary patents can help provide longer terms of commercial
exclusivity when they are filed and issued sequentially, as is common
practice. In particular, if each sequential patent has a later expiration
date and no generic manufacturer can make the drug without
infringing at least one patent, that will prolong the period of
exclusivity in the marketplace. Accordingly, some refer to this patent
strategy as "evergreening" because, although different aspects of the
drug are patented, patent protection seems "evergreen." Although
some suggest this term is derogatory or incorrect,7 5 the term is widely
used by scholars and policymakers. 76

&

72.
Dennis Crouch, Patent Term: Comparing 17-Years-From-Issue to 20-Years-FromFiling, PATENTLY-0 (Dec. 12, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/one-of-the-mostimportant-attributes-of-a-patent-is-its-term-or-duration-of-enforceability-in- 1995-the-us-patentsystem-beg.html (noting that most US patent terms are about seventeen years and eight
months).
73.
See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals,28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491 (2007) (finding
effective term from 1995-2005 to be 13.8, but 11.2 years from 2002-2005); C. Scott Hemphill
Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH EcON. 327 (2012) [hereinafter Hemphill & Sampat,
Evergreening] (finding effective patent term is twelve years); Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas
Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within- and Between- Patent
Competition in the U.S. PharmaceuticalsIndustry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 643, n.6 (2002) (noting that
the average effective patent life for drugs is eleven to twelve years, "whereas the effective patent
life for products other than pharmaceuticals is 18.5 years").
74.
This is true, even though a number of countries grant an extension of patent term
for drug patents in recognition of this phenomena. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2012);
Australia Patents Act of 1990, (Cth) ch 6, pt 3, s 77; Patent Act, Act. No. 950 Dec. 31, 1961, art.
89 (S. Kor.) (as amended); Patent Act, Act. No. 121 of 1959, art. 67(2) (Japan) (technically
supplementary protection certificates). In addition, Canada may be considering this. E.g., Noel
Courage, Canadian Patent Term Extension is Coming, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4a6646ab-dbfd-4c8a-9832-41a5352e6732.
75.
An excellent example of this phenomena in fact occurred at the symposium, where a
federal judge suggested that those who complain about evergreening simply fail to understand
patent fundamentals. This inadequate defense of evergreening is also common among patent
owning pharmaceutical companies and those that seem to support their interests. See, e.g., GSK
Public Policy Positions: Evergreening, GLAXOSMITHKLINE (Aug. 2011), http://www.gsk.com/
media/280836/evergreening-policy.pdf; Scott Parker & Kevin Mooney, Is 'Evergreening'a Cause
for Concern? A Legal Perspective, 13 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 235, 238-39 (2007); European
Fed'n Pharm. Indus. & Ass'n, The Degree to Which Patenting, and in Particular Secondary
Patenting, Protect PharmaceuticalProducts During their Lifecycle is Often Misconstrued, EFPIA
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.efpia.eulblog/9/71/The-degree-to-which-patenting-and-in-particularsecondary-patenting-protect-pharmaceutical-products-during-their-lifecycle-is-often-
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One classic example of the effective use of secondary patents is
with the heartburn treatment sold as Prilosec. The patent on the
However, the manufacturer
active ingredient expired in 2001.77
obtained additional patents to help delay generic entry, including a
patent on an internal coating that helped ensure that the drug would
resist stomach acid.7 8 Although generic companies ultimately
prevailed, the litigation resulted in an extra fourteen months of
exclusivity for Prilosec, which resulted in more profits to the
manufacturer, as well as continued financial costs to consumers.79
Another example of the effective use of subsequent patent
filings exists with regard to the blockbuster antidepressant sold as
Paxil. The first patent on the active ingredient was filed in the
1970s. 8 0 Subsequent patents were obtained on this drug, with the last
patent expiring in 2019, sixteen years after the first patent expired. 8
Due to a successful challenge by a generic competitor, generic
approval and entry occurred in 2003.82 However, if that had not
occurred, the patent owner would have essentially had a full
In addition, even
additional term of sixteen years of protection.
though a generic option was available, many patients were still
switched to the newer patented version that provided an extended
release. 83
A more current example of the use of secondary patents is
related to Eli Lilly's lung cancer drug sold as Alimta. Although this
misconstrued [hereinafter EFPIA Study] (noting that "'incremental innovation' is in no way
lesser innovation either legally or scientifically").
76.
See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 4, at 1; AUSTL. PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note
16, at X-XI, 40, 105-06; EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 480, 930, 988, 994, 1018;
COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH:
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 131-32, 216 (2006).

77.
U.S. Patent No. 4,255,431 (filed Apr. 5, 1979); see also Gardiner Harris, Prilosec's
Maker Switches Users To Nexium, Thwarting Generics, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2002, 5:22 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1023326369679910840.
78.
E.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,786,505 (filed Apr. 20, 1987); U.S. Patent No. 4,853,230 (filed
Apr. 20, 1987); see also In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 2d 381, 393 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).

79.
Daniel I. Gorlin, Staving off Death: A Case Study of the PharmaceuticalIndustry's
Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises,63 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 823, 839 (2008).
U.S. Patent No. 4,000,196 (filed Dec. 17,.1974).
80.
81.
E.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (filed Oct. 23, 1986) (hemihyrate form); U.S. Patent
No. 5,872,132 (filed Oct. 19, 1996) (crystal forms); U.S. Patent No. 5,900,423 (filed Sep. 2, 1997)
(crystal forms); U.S. Patent No. 6,080,759 (filed Sept. 2, 1997) (process of making); U.S. Patent
No. 6,113,944 (filed June 30, 1998) (tablet formulation); see also Hemphill & Sampat,
Evergreening, supra note 73, at 328.
82.
E.g., Leia Abboud, Apotex to Market Generic Paxil Before Patent Issues are Resolved,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003; Hemphill & Sampat, Evergreening, supra note 73, at 328.
83.
E.g., Rosie Murray-West, GSK Steady After Launch of Generic Paxil, TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
10,
2003),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2862741/GSK-steady-after-launch-ofgeneric-Paxil.html (noting that 40 percent of patients were switched to the newer version).
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drug may not be as well known to consumers as Prilosec, it generates
well over $2 million in annual sales and is expected to generate $3.5
billion by 2016.84 The patent on the initial compound is set to expire
in 2017.85 However, Eli Lilly filed and obtained a second patent on the
method of using the compound together with vitamins that does not
expire until 2022 which will delay generic entry.8 6
The number of secondary patents covering individual drugs has
increased over the last three decades.87 In addition, companies are
more likely to obtain these patents on blockbuster drugs, each of
which, by definition, has over a billion dollars in sales.8 8 This seems
logical given that the industry generally relies predominantly on such
drugs for the majority of its profits. 89
Companies seem aware that secondary patents are often
vulnerable to challenges of invalidity.9 0 Nonetheless, because each
patent is presumed valid in most countries,9 1 even if one patent is
deemed invalid, a drug is more easily protected from generic
competition if protected by multiple secondary patents instead of a
single patent on the active ingredient.

84.
E.g., Peter Loftus, Eli Lilly Enters Unusual Patent Dispute, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18,
2013,
2:14
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323455104579
015291810290818; Manisha Rawat, ALIMTA's Patent: A Stronger Foothold?, SPECTRUM INTELL.
PROP. RIGHTS (Jan. 7, 2013), http://spectrumofintellectualpropertyrights.blogspot.com/2013/01/
alimtas-patent-stronger-foothold.html.
85.
U.S. Patent No. 5,344,932 (filed Mar. 22, 1991).
86.
U.S. Patent No. 7,772,209 (filed July 11, 2007) (antifolate combination therapies);
U.S. District Court Upholds Validity of Lilly's Alimta Patent Through 2022, ELI LILLY (Mar. 31,
2014), https:/investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=836688 (noting that latest patent
does not expire until 2022); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., No. 1:10cv-01376-TWP-DKL, 2014 WL 1350129 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2014), aff'd, 567 F.App'x. 967 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (rejecting challenge to patent as obvious by companies seeking to market generic
versions). However, Eli Lilly lost a challenge by Actavis to market a generic version in the UK.
English Court Rules Against Lilly in Alimta Vitamin Dosage Regimen Patent Lawsuit, ELI LILLY
(May 15, 2014), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=848148.
87.
E.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 615 (2011); EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note 6,

at 188.
88.

E.g., Hemphill & Sampat, Evergreening, supra note 73, at 328.

89.
E.g., PHRMA, DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE
NEED TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND PREDICTABLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 (2002); NAT'L
INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 4 (2002).

90.
EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 192 (noting companies admitting a
strategy to have patents which "might not be 'rock solid' rather than no patent).
91.
India is an exception to the usual presumption of validity, such as that which exists
in the United States. Compare The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39 §13.4, Acts of Parliament, 1970
(India) amended by Act of 2005 (noting patent examination does not "warrant the validity of any
patent"), with 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); see also Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, § 43(2) (Can.)
(showing presumption of validity in Canada similar to US presumption).
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2. Follow-On Patents in Combination with Active Marketing
In addition, companies may develop and patent "follow-on"
inventions, such as slightly different versions of existing drugs, to
maintain market share after the patent term of the original drug
expires. These variations may be mirror image versions of the prior
active ingredient, slower release formulas, or combinations of existing
drugs.
These "newer" variations are viewed by patent owning
companies as legitimate innovations, whereas critics often view the
practice as another type of evergreening. 92
Although incremental innovation is common in all industries,
what happens in the pharmaceutical industry is likely unique. The
practice of patenting follow-on drugs often occurs in combination with
substantial, and usually successful, marketing to consumers and
doctors to "switch" to a newly patented drug. 93 The follow-on drug
typically launches towards the end of the patent life of the original
drug, before a generic of the original drug is available. 94 In addition,
the company will often either reduce the price of the new drug or even
remove the old drug from the market to promote a switch to the new
drug. 95 Importantly, whatever mechanism a company uses, it aims to
persuade doctors and consumers to switch to the newer drug with a
new patent life before a low-cost generic version of the original enters
the market, because once a generic enters the market, it is more
difficult to convince patients to switch to a more expensive follow-on
product. 96 However, even if a lower cost generic is able to enter the
market, doctors and consumers may not switch to a lower cost generic
drug once they have started using another drug.9 7 As stated by one
92.
E.g., THOMAS, supra note 4.
93.
EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 351, 362.
94.
E.g., id. at 356.
95.
E.g., id. at 351, 360-61, 364-65 (noting that this was a problem with at least nine
products); see also David Balto, Removing Obstacles to Generic Drug Competition: A Critical
Priority for Health Care Reform, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (June 2009), available at
http://www.dcantitrustlaw.com/assets/content/documents/CAP/Removing%200bstacles%20to%20
Generic%20Drug%2OCompetition.pdf (noting alternative strategy of increasing the price of the
drug whose patent is about to expire to encourage switching to the newer version that one
company successfully used to encourage patients to switch from Provigil to more newly patented
Nuvigil). The European Commission has since modified its laws so that withdrawal of a
reference product will not bar entry of a generic version. Commission Directive 2001/83, art.
10(1), 2001 O.J. (L. 311) (EC).
96.
E.g., EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 359. In one extreme situation,
Pfizer recently threatened doctors that they might infringe by prescribing a generic version of
Lyrica for pain due to a new patent on the use of a drug for pain. E.g., Kevin E. Noonan, The
Uncomfortable Intersection between the Practice of Medicine and Reality, PATENT DocS (Dec. 29,
2014), http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/12/the-uncomfortable-intersection-between-the-practiceof-medicine-and-reality.html.
97.
EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 360.
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company, "Once the patient is switched to a [follow-on] product the
physician does not have to, cannot and will not switch him to a
generic, and what is more important: the pharmacist cannot
substitute!!"98
The manufacturer of Prilosec also engaged in this strategy to
protect its profits by marketing Nexium, which is a variation of the
compound sold as Prilosec.99 Manufacturer AstraZeneca had strong
motivation to do so; in 2000 alone, Prilosec earned an estimated $6
billion 0 0 and was the world's best selling pharmaceutical in 2001.101
Given the pending expiration of the Prilosec patent, 102 it initiated the
"Shark Fin Project" to develop a way to protect its market share.1 03
The company also conducted a number of tests to compare 20 mg of
Prilosec against 40 mg of what would be marketed as Nexium, to
establish that the newer drug was "better." 0 4 Even with this uneven
playing field, not all the study results showed superiority of the newer
drug.1 05 However, AstraZeneca only published the somewhat positive
test results: improvement of 90 percent versus 87 percent.1 06 The FDA
approved Nexium in February 2001, six months prior to the earliest
possible generic entry. 107
AstraZeneca was highly successful in prompting most
consumers to switch from Prilosec to Nexium. In addition to massive
advertisement concerning the "improved" drug (based on the selective
publication of the stronger dose of Nexium), the company discounted
Nexium slightly below the cost of Prilosec, provided free samples to
doctors, and provided discounts to managed care plans and

Id.
98.
99.
This is referred to by some as "chiral switching" since it involves replacing a mixture
of two chemical mirror images of compounds (called a "racemic mixture) with just one half (a
single enantiomer), which may be "purer" and thus more effective. E.g., Yoshitani et al., supra
note 64, at 392.
100.
ASTRAZENECA, ANNUAL REPORT & FORM 20-F 2000, 3-4 (2001) (reporting $6.3
billion from gastrointestinal drugs in 2000); see also Harris,supra note 77.
101.
Gorlin, supra note 79.
102.
U.S. Patent No. 4,255,431 (filed Apr. 5, 1979); Gorlin, supra note 79, at 834 (noting
expiration of patent on Oct. 5, 2001). The patent was then granted a six-month extension for
completing pediatric studies, such that it did not expire until October 2001. E.g., Harris, supra
note 77.
103.
Cheng, supra note 69, at 1490; Malcolm Gladwell, High Prices, NEW YORKER, Oct.
25, 2004, at 86, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/10/25/high-prices.
104.

E.g., MARcIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 78-79 (2003).

Id.
105.
106.
Harris, supra note 77.
107.
FDA Approves AstraZeneca's Nexiumn with Comprehensive Set of Indications,
ASTRAZENECA
(Feb. 21, 2001), http://www.astrazeneca.com/Media/Press-releases/Article/
20010221--FDA-APPROVES-ASTRAZENECAs-NEXIUTM-WITH-COMPREHENSIVE;
see also
Gorlin, supra note 79, at 847.

2015]

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

319

hospitals. 0 8 Nexium was introduced one month before Prilosec's
patent would expire, 109 before any generic versions of Prilosec could
enter the market. In addition, Prilosec was withdrawn from the
prescription market and was only available over-the-counter.1 10 Since
Nexium is technically a different compound than Prilosec, even if very
similar, pharmacists could not automatically substitute generic
Prilosec for prescriptions of Nexium, even when generic versions of
Prilosec were available. Accordingly, even when generic Prilosec was
available by prescription, sales were modest."' Until Nexium recently
became available as an over-the-counter medication, it was the most
prescribed product in its class, despite the existence of other patented
drugs in its class, as well as a substantially cheaper over-the-counter
generic version of Prilosec that costs less than $2 per day. 112
The most extreme situation is where the follow-on patented
drug of incremental improvement is the only option for patients
because the original drug has been removed from the market. In such
a case, advertising of the advantages of the new drug are not even
necessary since consumers have no alternative. Importantly, when
the generic is launched, unless doctors specifically prescribe the
generic, there is no automatic substitution of the generic for the newly
patented improvement because even though they are very similar,
they are not identical. As recently noted by one CEO, once patients
are switched to the newer version, "it's very difficult for the generics
then to reserve-commute back, . . . [t]hey don't have the sales force,

they don't have the capabilities to do that." 113 The manufacturer of
Prilosec could be seen to partially engage in this strategy by changing
Prilosec to an over-the-counter drug, but it only did so after promoting
Nexium as beneficial.
In addition, Prilosec technically remained
available as an over-the-counter drug. However, in some cases,
108.
E.g., Gorlin, supra note 79, at 848 (noting that the company secured agreements to
have Nexium be the exclusive proton pump inhibitor used by the hospital in exchange for deep
discounts, as well as agreements with insurance companies for favorable placement on their
formularies).
109.
Gladwell, supra note 103, at 86.
110.
Walgreen Co. v. Astra Zeneca Pharms. L.P., No 06-02084 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 7,
2006).
111.
See Walgreen Co. v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C.
2008) ("[I]f Nexium had not gone to market, the manufacturers of generic substitutes to
prescription Prilosec would have far more than their current 30% of the market . . . ."); Gorlin,
supra note 79, at 849 (noting that contrary to analyst predictions that generics of Prilosec could
be 50 percent of the 2004 market, they were only 14 percent of prescriptions).
112.
E.g., Schondelmeyer, supra note 57, at 123.
113.
Mike Masnick, The Nasty Patent Games Drug Companies Play to Stop You from
Getting Cheaper Drugs, TECHDIRT (Jan. 7, 2015, 8:09 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20141225/06374929525/nasty-patent-games-drug-companies-play-to-stop-you-getting-cheaperdrugs.shtml (quoting Actavis CEO).
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consumers may have no access at all to earlier versions that are
cheaper. For example, Abbott successfully used this strategy of
removing the older drug from market right before its patent expired
several times to protect its sales of cholesterol-reducing drug Tricor
from generic competition for nearly a decade. 114 Most recently,
Actavis publicly announced its intention to pursue a similar strategy
of withdrawing its Namenda drug before patent expiry to prevent
generic competition.1 1 5
Although such actions properly prompt
antitrust disputes, the need for such actions may still result in a delay
in generic competition. 116
Although drug companies often assert that complaints of
evergreening are unjustified because patients can elect to purchase
cheaper alternatives if they are not convinced the patented version is
superior, these examples clearly illustrate this argument is not
necessarily true. Also, drugs are sold in a unique market with
noticeable information asymmetry.
Patients do not have full
knowledge or control of what prescription drugs they purchase.
Doctors can better evaluate whether the cost of a new drug is justified,
but studies show that doctors are often not cost-conscious. 117 In
addition, even if doctors were cost-conscious, they may not truly be
able to evaluate whether a new drug is better because they are
114.
E.g., Nicholas S. Downing et al., How Abbott's Fenofibrate Franchise Avoided
Generic Competition, 122 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 724 (2012); David Balto, supra note 95, at 15.
115.
Ed Silverman, Why the Actavis Product Switching Case May Transform Pharma,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/01/15/why-theactavis-product-switching-case-may-transform-pharma/.
116.
E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006). For
additional details of antitrust issues, see David Balto, supra note 95, at 15-17; Cheng, supra
note 69, at 1471. However, one federal court recently issued a preliminary injunction to prevent
a company from taking such action. New York v. Actavis, No. 14 Civ. 7473., 2014 WL 7015198
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014); see also Owen Dyer, Company's Attempt to Switch Its Patients to a New
Drug is Foiled, 349 BRIT. MED. J. 7802 (2014); Silverman, supra note 115. The case is on appeal.
See, e.g., Defendant-Appellants Brief, New York v. Actavis, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit Case 14-4624,
Document 15, Jan. 12, 2015, available at
http://freepdfhosting.com/f039f6b3f3.pdf.
117.
Some have recently suggested that doctors should be more aware of prices. Jeffrey
L. Anderson et al., ACCIAHA Statement on Cost/Value Methodology in Clinical Practice
Guidelines and Performance Measures, 63 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 2304 (2014); see also Andrew
Pollack, Cost of Treatment May Influence Doctors, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2014, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/business/treatment-cost-could-influence-doctorsadvice.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting shift in medical guidelines recommending that
doctors consider price). At the same time, the FDA is investigating advertising that includes
prices and whether that would result in consumers and doctors overlooking safety and
effectiveness. E.g., Food and Drug Administration Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 26,255 (May 7, 2014)
(announcing opportunity for public comment on proposed research of direct to consumer
advertising of drugs that includes costs); see also Ed Silverman, FDA Asks: What Would Happen
If Drugs Advertised Their Price, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 13, 2014, 12:55 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/05/13/fda-asks-what-would-happen-if-drugsadvertised-their-price/.
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generally presented with company-sponsored studies of the "benefits"
of a new drug. There are a number of cases where a drug initially
promoted as an improvement by drug companies has later been found
to not be an improvement, or even harmful, when independent studies
Moreover, both doctors and patients are
were conducted.1 18
susceptible to substantial advertising by companies; 1 9 in fact, data
indicates that they spend more on marketing than on researching and
developing new drugs.1 20
3. Additional Complications
One major issue with both secondary and follow-on patents is
When generic
that they are often of questionable patentability.
competitors challenge these patents, courts find many invalid or not
infringed-studies concerning the United States and the European
Union found that generic companies win nearly three-quarters of
cases. 12 1 However, it can be difficult and expensive to challenge these
118.
For example, antihypertensives to treat high pressure known as ACE inhibiters
quickly replaced older and cheaper treatments, but were found to not only not be significantly
better, but, in fact worse in some respects nearly two decades after they were introduced when
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) did an independent study. Ho, supra note 1, at 502.
Similarly, hormone replacement therapy was initially widely adopted to address menopause, as
well as to prevent heart disease, but was later revealed to actually increase the risk of heart
disease after an independent study by the NIH. Id.
119.
E.g., Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and
its

Influence

on

Physicians and

Patients, THE

PEW

CHARITABLE

TRUSTS

(Nov.

11,

2013), http://www.pewtrusts.orglen/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-theprescribers-pharmaceutical-industry- marketing-and- its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients
(noting that patients request advertised products); see also Ho, supra note 1, at 480 (providing
additional cites concerning the influence of advertisements on physicians).
120.
See, e.g., Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New
Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29
(2008); Rachel Kornfield et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers and Providers,
2001-2010, 8 PLOS MED. 1 (2013); Novartis Set To Remain Top Spender As R&D Investment
Dips,
EVALUATE
(June
18,
2012),
http://www.evaluategroup.comUniversall
View.aspx?type=Story&id=302035&sectionlD=&isEPVantage=yes
(noting that the industry
spent $135 billion on research in 2011, which is less than 20 percent of sales). The advertising
expenses are particularly large in the United States where direct to consumer advertising is
permissible. E.g., Keeping Watch Over Direct-to-ConsumerAds, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May
10, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucml07170.htm (noting that the
United States is one of the only countries worldwide to allow direct to consumer advertising); see
also 21 C.F.R. § 202 (2014) (authorizing advertisements).
121.

See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION

20 (2002) (finding that generic companies win in 73 percent of challenges, with 28 percent of
patents found invalid, 35 percent of the cases finding lack of infringement, and 10 percent of
cases abandoned by the patent owner before a judicial finding); EC PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 224-26 (noting that generic companies won more than 60 percent of all cases, 71
percent of challenges they initiated, and 74 percent of cases involving secondary patents); see
also W. "RP' Raghupathi, Pharmaceutical Patent Validity: An Empirical Study of the Recent
Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2008-2011), 18-19 (Fordham
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patents. 12 2 In addition, there may be other issues that interfere with
incentives to challenge these patents. For example, in the United
States, Congress actually attempted to ensure that the public not be
burdened by invalid patents by providing a valuable commercial
bounty to the first generic competitor that showed a drug patent was
invalid or not infringed; the bounty is a six-month period during which
other generic competitors could not sell their products. 123 However,
patent owning companies are eliminating the incentive to challenge
patents by either paying generics not to challenge their patents, or
introducing their own generic version. 124 Although the US Supreme
Court recently recognized that paying generics not to challenge may
be an antitrust problem, it is currently unclear whether the practice
will soon abate.1 25
In the meantime, without the incentive to
challenge improperly issued patents, consumers and countries may
face higher than necessary costs.

Univ., Working Paper), available at http://ghime.org/pdf/patent-enforcement.pdf (finding about
half of patents challenged by generics held invalid).
122.
E.g., Maurice Ross, Leveling the Playing Field-The Role of Venture Capital in
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 79 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 730 (2010); see also
Ravikant Bhardwaj et al., The Impact of Patent Linkage on Marketing of Generic Drugs, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 316, 318 (2013) (noting that only large generic companies can afford to
challenge validity of patents and the exclusivity provided for generics may not recover the cost of
litigation); EUROPEAN GENERIC MEDS. Ass'N, PATENT-RELATED BARRIERS TO MARKET ENTRY FOR
GENERIC MEDICINES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 17-22 (Kristof Roox ed., 2008) (noting challenges

to generic companies in litigation).
123.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also
David A. Balto, We'll Sell Generics Too: Innovator Drug Makers Are Gaming the Regulatory
System
and
Harming
Competition,
29
LEGAL
TIMES
(Mar.
20,
2006),
http://www.dcantitrustlaw.com/assets/content/documents/2006/article.legaltimes.Balto_3_20061
.pdf ("But for the potential reward of six-month exclusivity that represents the vast majority of
potential profits from generic entry, many firms might forgo challenging patents.").
124.

See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, HATCH

WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 11-14 (2012) (explaining that the settlements raise
antitrust issues); see FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY FOR DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST

&

CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010); Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006); Ralph B. Kalfayan
Vic A. Merjanian, Ensuring Access to Medication: The Supreme Court's Opinion in FTC v.
Actavis (Oct. 18, 2013), http://kkbs-law.com/2013/10/18/ensuring-access-to-affordable-medicationthe-supreme-courts-opinion-in-f-t-c-v-actavis-inc/.
125.
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); see also Proposed Brief
for 49 Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, In re Cipro Cases I & II
(No. S198616), available at http://saverilawfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-03-18Cipro-49-Professors-Amicus-App-and-Brief.pdf
(arguing that Bayer's payment to generic
companies to delay introduction of their generic version of the antibiotic Cipro is inconsistent
with the recent Actavis ruling).
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III. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
This Section provides a comparative perspective of two
countries that have different patent laws from the United
States: India and Canada. These countries are at different stages of
economic development, yet both have patent laws that aim to comply
with international standards, while still promoting access to
affordable drugs. As noted earlier, US patent laws are not focused on
ensuring access to affordable medicine and have always permitted
drugs to be patentable; although there are laws passed pursuant to
the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 that promote faster approval of
generic drugs, US patent laws have never been designed to promote
access to affordable medicine as a primary goal. In contrast, India and
Canada have a history of promoting lower cost generic drugs and
although they were recently required to modify their patent laws to
comply with international agreements, they have chosen divergent
methods to do so. India's patent provision is arguably a restriction on
patentable subject matter, whereas Canada's provision is a new
interpretation of the utility requirement.

A. India
India is an example of a developing country that has taken
maximum use of flexibilities under TRIPS to craft patent laws that
accommodate its policy preferences. However, before addressing those
current laws, the historical context of India's patent laws is helpful to
place current laws in proper context.
India first took steps to address the impact of patents on drugs
in the mid-1900s. Before that time, India was under British rule and
its patent laws reflected the UK patent laws, which did not exclude
drugs from patentability.1 2 6 After India seceded from the UK in 1947,
it appointed a committee to examine the implications of the patent act
to see if it was in the national interest. 127 The committee found that
the patent act mostly benefited foreigners and did not promote Indian
scientific research.1 2 8 The committee also recommended "compulsory
licensing" of patents on drugs to ensure that such products would be

126.
The first patent act in India was in 1856 and modeled on the British Patent Law
Amendment Act of 1852, which provided patents on inventions that were new and useful.
Katherine Connor Linton & Nicholas Corrado, U.S. Int'l. Trade Comm'n., A "Calibrated
Approach'" PharmaceuticalFIDIand the Evolution of Indian Patent Law, J. OF INT'L COMMERCE
AND ECON. 1, 3 (Aug. 2007); see also, e.g., NARAYANAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2005).

127.
Janice Mueller, The Tiger Awakens, 68 PITT. L. REV. 491, 511 (2007) (noting that
this happened on Jan. 10, 1948).
128.
See id. at 511-12.
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available to the public at the cheapest price; this would require owners
of these patents to accept licenses at government determined
royalties, rather than charge their desired prices-hence, the name
compulsory. 129
In 1957, a committee led by Justice Ayyangar again studied
Indian patent law and found that it still failed to stimulate domestic
invention and that it should be designed to minimize possible abuses
of the patent system. 130 One suggested improvement was to exclude
drugs from patentable subject matter to prevent detriments to public
health that would occur due to the inevitable expense of patents on
drugs. 13 1 In making this recommendation, the report noted that other
countries had previously taken similar steps; Germany was the first to
permit patents only on methods but not drug products, and other
countries including Brazil, Japan, and Norway followed suit. 13 2 In
fact, the report noted that the United States was the only country to
not restrict patent protection at all for food or medicine. 133 Following
this report, India enacted The Patents Act, 1970 (the "Indian Patent
Act"), which repealed patents on drugs. 134 In addition, the Indian
Patent Act reduced the patent term for patents on methods of making
drugs from fourteen years to five years from the patent grant.1 35
Further, expansive compulsory license provisions for patented
processes of making medicine were included. 36 India's patent laws
are generally attributed with helping to promote a thriving and
substantial generic drug industry 37 that currently supplies a

129.
See id. at 512-13.
130.
Novartis v. Union of India, (2013) 6 S.C.C. 1, paras. 34-38 (India); Shri Justice N.
Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision of the Patents Law 3, 13-14, 20 (Sept. 1959),
availableat http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ayyangar-committee-report.pdf.
131.
Ayyangar, supra note 130, at 23.
132.
Id. at 3, 24.
Id.
133.
134.
In particular, the Act prohibited patents on "substances intended for use, or capable
of being used as food or medicine or drug." Although it was possible to obtain a patent on a
process of making a drug, only one such method could be patented. The Patents Act, No. 39 of
1970, A.I.R. MANUAL 450, ch. 2 §§3 5(a)-(b) (India).
135.
Id. at ch. 6 §53(a)-(b).
136.
See id. at §§ 84-87.
137.
Mueller, supra note 127, at 514-15 (noting dramatic increase in domestic generic
drug manufacturing that also reduced the cost of drugs); Rajesh Kochar, Indian Pharmaceutical
Industry: Policies, Achievements and Challenges, 106 CURRENT SC. 1345 (2014) (explaining
India's pharmaceutical industry "success story"). Of course, lack of patent protection on drugs
alone is not enough to create a thriving generic industry. India was able to succeed because it
had the technical capacity to develop such an industry, whereas some other countries that had
similar laws did not. See CHAUDHURI, supra note 41, at 59 (noting that the pharmaceutical
industry was underdeveloped in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Uruguay, and Vietnam because
they lacked technological and entrepreneurial capacity to take advantage of the patent laws).
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substantial number of drugs and drug components worldwide, 138
especially to the developing world,' 3 9 such that it is considered the
"pharmacy of the developing world." 140
In 1994, India became a member of the WTO. As noted earlier,
WTO members must comply with TRIPS, including its patent
provisions. However, as a country that did not provide patents on
drug products prior to the conclusion of TRIPS, India was permitted a
ten-year period, until 2005, to do SO. 1 4 1 Although other countries that
did not provide patents on drugs were also permitted to do so, India is
the only country that took advantage of this provision.
India was in a unique position before amending its law to
permit patents on drugs, as opposed to only processes for making
drugs and drug compounds. Although historically, other countries had
laws similar to India, not only was India the last developing country
in the WTO to amend its laws (not considering least developed
countries that are not yet required to do so), but India was also a
major manufacturer and exporter of generic drugs to the rest of the
world. This was well recognized by organizations and policy makers
that aimed to ensure that India would exercise the maximum amount
of flexibility under TRIPS when required to finally provide patents on
drugs in 2005. For example, the World Health Organization wrote to

See, e.g., DEPT. OF PHARM., MINISTRY OF CHEMS. & FERTILIZERS, INDIAN
138.
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: WORLD QUALITY MEDICINES AT REASONABLE PRICE 1, available at

http://pharmaceuticals.gov.in/aboutus.pdf (noting that India ranks fourth in the world in terms
of generic production and exports worldwide, including to the United States, Western Europe,
and Japan); Ajoy Bera & Ashish Mukherjee, The Importance of Generic Drugs in India, 2 INT'L J.
PHARM., CHEM. & BIOLOGICAL SCI. 575, 578 (2012) (noting that India ranks third in the world
in terms of manufacturing drug products by volume); Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack,
India's Supreme Court to Hear Dispute on Drug Patents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/globallindias-supreme-court-to-hear-longsimmering-dispute-on-drug-patents.html (noting that India is the third largest drug producer by
volume and exports more generic drugs than any other country).
139.
UNICEF recognizes India as the largest supplier of generics for essential medicines
that it distributes to developing countries. UNICEF, 2012 SUPPLY ANNUAL REPORT: SUPPLY
CHAINS
FOR CHILDREN
37 (2012),
available at http://www.unicef.org/supply/files/
UNICEFSupplyAnnualReport_2012_web.pdf; see also Bajaj & Pollack, supra note 138 (noting
that India has been the largest provider of generic drugs to poor countries).
140.
This is especially the case because India supplies over 80 percent of HIV
medications. Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic
Manufacturers in Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT'L. AIDS
SOC'Y. 35 (2010); MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE

REDUCTIONS
6
(2014),
available
at
http://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/
MSFUTW17thEdition_4_b.pdf; see also Simon Reid-Henry & Hans Lofgran, Pharmaceutical
Companies Putting Health of Worlds Poor at Risk, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jul/26/pharmaceuticalcompanies-health-worlds-poor-risk (stating that the label "pharmacy of the developing world" is
not surprising given the vast number of exports).
141.
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 65 § 4.
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the Indian Minister of Health and Family Welfare to express concern
about the future supply of generic antiretrovirals.1 42 Similarly, the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) wrote to
India to note concern about Indian proposals that "threaten to
undermine India's leadership" in terms of making it more difficult to
provide generic drugs to other countries. 143 Against this backdrop,
India held hearings and ultimately amended its patent laws to comply
with TRIPS while also aiming to minimize evergreening. India also
amended its patent laws to include a robust system of oppositions both
before and after patent issuance to help ensure patent validity.144
1. Section 3(d)
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act was introduced in 2005 to
permit some incremental innovations in the pharmaceutical arena to
be patented, but not innovations that do not substantially add social
value with respect to improved "efficacy." In addition, this provision
bars new uses of already known substances. In particular, Section
3(d) excludes from the scope of inventions "the mere discovery of a new
form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement
of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any
property or new use for a known substance .. ."145 In addition, this
same section includes an explanation to clarify that known substances
include variations that companies have been known to patent, such as
metabolites and isomers. 146 All of these variations are common to the
practice of evergreening that India intended to restrict as having a
weak policy basis for granting without improved efficacy. Although
the standard clearly tied patentability of similar substances to
enhanced "efficacy," that term is not defined in the patent act itself.
The term "efficacy" is now understood to be therapeutic or
clinical efficacy, following extensive litigation by patent owner
Novartis in an attempt to obtain a patent on its cancer drug Gleevec
after previously patenting a similar compound in most other
countries. 147 The Indian Supreme Court recently held that "efficacy" in
this context depends on "the function, utility or the purpose of the
142.
Novartis v. Union of India, (2013), 6 S.C.C. 1, para. 76 (India).
143.
Id. at 45.
144.
E.g., The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2005) § 25.125.2.
Id. § 3(d).
145.
Id.
146.
147.
Novartis v. Union of India, (2013), 6 S.C.C 1, 90 (India). Novartis could not
previously obtain an India patent on Gleevec when it obtained patents in the United States and
other countries because India did not provide patents on drugs at the time and was not required
to. Id.
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product," such that for a drug that claims to cure a disease, "efficacy
can only be 'therapeutic efficacy."'14 8 In addition, the Court noted
that this must be judged narrowly given the explanatory note to
Section 3(d), such that "not all advantageous or beneficial properties
are relevant, but only such properties that directly relate
to .. . therapeutic efficacy." 49 The Court did not resolve whether
increased "bioavailability," which refers to the amount of a drug in the
bloodstream, constitutes therapeutic efficacy. Novartis' sole claim to
improved efficacy was that the invention in question resulted in an
improvement of 30 percent bioavailability. The Court noted that the
parties disagreed on whether bioavailability alone constitutes efficacy
and ultimately did not reach this issue because Novartis did not
establish adequate evidence of this in the patent application itself.1 50
B. Canada
Canada is an interesting example of an industrialized country
with a historically very different approach to drug patents than that of
the United States. Until Canada signed the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States, which came into
force in 1994, there were two notable differences relating to drug
patents. 15 1 First, Canada only permitted processes of making drugs to
be patented and not drugs themselves. 152 Moreover, even for these
processes, Canada required that they be subject to a "compulsory
license," which means that the patent owner would need to permit
someone else to make and use the patented invention and receive only
a government determined royalty that is most likely far less than
what the patent owner would prefer to charge. 153

148.
Id. 1 180. Of course, this term could be further defined, especially in light of a recent
controversial decision denying Gilead Sciences a patent relating to its blockbuster Hepatitis C
cure sold as Sovaldi that Gilead plans to appeal. E.g., EJ Lane, Gilead to Appeal India Patent
Ruling on Niche Sovaldi Claim, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.fiercepharma.com/
story/gilead-appeal-india-patent-ruling-niche-sovaldi-claim/2015-01- 16; RNA, Intellectual Prop.
Attorneys, Gilead's Sovaldi Fails 'Enhancement of Known Efficacy' Test in India (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.lexology.comllibrary/detail.aspx?g=al7e7a83-eebb-4aab-9cd7-bda9eO7bfedd.
149.
Novartis, 6 S.C.C. para. 180.
Id. at para. 189.
150.
151.
See Patent Act Amendments, S.C. 1987, c. 41 (Bill C-22) (Can). However, this was
intended originally to cease effect in four years. Patent Act (1987) s. 39 (1.1) (Can).
152.
E.g., Patent Act, S.C. 1923, c. 23, s. 17; see Cameron's Patent & Trade Secrets Law,
Chapter 9, CanadianDrug Patent Laws and Regulations 9.2.2(b) (noting that prior to Bill C-22,
only methods of making drugs and not drugs themselves were patentable), available at
http://www.jurisdiction.com/patweb09.pdf.
153.
Patent Act, s. 17(2) (Can.); Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, s. 67-73 (Can.); Patent
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 s. 65-71 (Can.); see also Kristen Douglas & C6lia Jutras, Law & Gov't
Div., Parliament of Canada, Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products in Canada-
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Canada's compulsory license law was intended to ensure that
products were made available to the public at the lowest possible price
while giving the inventor due reward for the research leading to the
invention. 154 Of course, as recent global controversies in Thailand and
India indicate, patent owners generally do not consider any
compulsory license to provide due reward.1 55 Nonetheless, this was
Canada's approach and until NAFTA, over a thousand applications for
compulsory licenses were made and the majority were granted.1 56
Although Canada modified its patent laws after NAFTA, it also
took another step in an attempt to prevent patents on drugs from
barring access to affordable medicine. In particular, Canada created
the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board (PMPRB) that
introduced price controls on patented medicines with the goal of
ensuring affordable health care costs. The PMPRB is mandated to
ensure that prices for new and existing patented medicines are not
"excessive."15 7
1. Promise Doctrine
Canada has not changed its patent act since signing NAFTA,
but since 2005, its courts have been applying a judicial interpretation
to the utility requirement that has resulted in the invalidation of

Chronology of Significant Events (2008), http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/
prb9946-e.htm.
154.
Patent Act, s. 41(3) (Can).
155.
E.g., Cynthia Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047,
1064-81 (2009); PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 24. Opposition to compulsory
licenses is so strong, that sometimes statements are actually incorrect, even from those in
leadership positions. E.g., Int'l IP Enforcement: Protecting Patents, Trade Secrets, and Market
Access: Hearing on S. 119 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the
Internet of the Comm. on The Judiciary H.R., 112th Cong. 16-18 (2012) (statement of Teresa
Stanek Rea, Deputy Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Deputy Dir. of the
USPTO); see also Brook Baker, USPTO Official Misleads Congress on Permissible Scope of
Compulsory Licenses to Increase Access to Medicines, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (June 28, 2012),
http://infojustice.org/archives/26461 (discussing Stanek's statement and her incorrect comment
that India's grant of a compulsory license was in violation of TRIPS). After substantial criticism,
Stanek issued a statement correcting her prior testimony. Teresa Stanek Rea, USPTO on the
Hill: Supporting U.S. Innovators in Global Markets, USPTO.GOV (July 2, 2012),
www.uspto.goviblog/director/entry/uspto-on-the-hill-supporting.
156.
Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzhal, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented
Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the
Practice in Canada and the USA 20 (2003) (ICTSD Programme on IPRs & Sustainable Dev.,
Issue Paper no. 5 2003).
157.

PATENTED MEDS. PRICES REVIEw BD., COMPENDIUM OF GUIDELINES, POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES 4 (Mar. 2008) (Can.), available at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/cmfiles/compo8e38nby-3182008-1638.pdf.
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roughly a dozen pharmaceutical patents.1 5 8 In particular, if a patent
or patent application "promises" a certain result, such as fewer side
effects, evidence of that promise, such as data establishing fewer side
effects, must be disclosed or "soundly predicted" in the patent to
satisfy utility pursuant to the "promise doctrine." If there is no
promise, only a scintilla of utility is required.
Although the promise doctrine has been criticized as without
basis, the policy articulated by the Canadian Supreme Court is
grounded in basic patent policy. In 2002, it suggested that rigorous
disclosure was especially important for pharmaceutical patents to
prevent a "shot-gun approach" to patent applications that would have
serious costs on the public. 159 Although Canada's interpretation of
what is "useful" is different than the interpretations of other
countries, countries widely recognize that a patent should only be
granted when the inventor has provided enough to justify the social
contract of a patent.160
The promise doctrine has been criticized not only by
patent-owning pharmaceutical companies, but also by the United
States on a number of grounds.1 6 ' Some key criticisms are that it is
inconsistent with TRIPS, inconsistent with the practices of other
countries, discriminates against pharmaceuticals, is ambiguous and
thus leads to uncertainty and undermines patent incentives, and that
it is unfair to apply the doctrine retroactively to issued patents. The
next Part of this Article will explain why Canada's law is in fact
consistent with TRIPS.
However, the other criticisms will be

158.
E.g., John Lechleiter, How Lax Patent Rules in Canadaare Suffocating Life-Saving
Innovation,
FORBES
(Aug.
26,
2013,
9:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/
johnlechleiter/2013/08/26/how-lax-patent-rules-in-canada-are-suffocating-life-saving-innovation/
(noting that approximately twenty drugs have been challenged on this ground). Although
invalidation of patents based on this doctrine is new, it has its roots in English law and arguably
existed in Canadian law even before 2005. E.g., Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of
the Patent in Canada andAround the World, 30 CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 35, 50 (2014).
159.
Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation, Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, para. 80 (Can.).
160.
E.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966) (Patent is not a "hunting
license").
161.
E.g., Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, OFFICE OF US TRADE REP., 2014 SPECIAL
301 REP. 49 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SPECIAL 301 REP.]; PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1,
at 77; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Eli
Lilly
Notice
of
Arbitration],
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italawl582.pdf (seeking compensation from Canada under NAFTA's investment chapter for
invalidating two patents under the promise doctrine). In addition, there is criticism from
academic commentators as well. See generally Norman Siebrasse, The False Doctrine of False
Promise, 29 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 3 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract.id=2171762. But see generally Norman Siebrasse, The Argument in
Favour of the False Promise Doctrine, SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.sufficientdescription.com/2011/09/argument-in-favour-of-false-promise.html.
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addressed here to establish that even beyond being consistent with
TRIPS, these criticisms are unwarranted.
The first contention that Canada's promise doctrine is flawed
because it is inconsistent with common practice of other countries is a
red herring since there is currently no requirement for all countries to
have uniform patent laws. Although countries did attempt to create
uniform patentability standards through a Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, that effort failed.1 62 Accordingly, it should be clear that
countries can continue a long tradition of tailoring patent laws to meet
their own domestic policy interests, so long as they are consistent with
the minimum requirements of TRIPS. Moreover, some scholars have
noted that although Canada is the only country to apply the "promise
doctrine" in interpreting whether an application or patent is useful,
other countries effectively have similar requirements, demonstrating
that Canada's law is actually not an outlier.1 63
Another common complaint is that the promise doctrine is
discriminatory in that pharmaceutical patents are the ones primarily
invalidated. However, the doctrine is not limited to pharmaceuticals.
In fact, the Canadian Manual for Patent Practice uses a
non-pharmaceutical example.1 64 In addition, it has been applied to at
least one mechanical invention.1 65 Moreover, there are a number of
facially neutral patent requirements that impact different types of
inventions differently, further underscoring that differential impact
does not necessarily mean that a patent standard is invalid.1 66
162.
Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: CriticalReflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 89
(2007); Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, World Intellectual Property Organization,
May 12-16, 2003, SCP/9/5
(2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/
en/scp_9/scp_9_5.pdf; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Expert Report of Daniel Gervais, 9-18 (Jan. 23,
2015), available at http://italaw.comisites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4139.pdf (discussing
failure of attempts to harmonize utility requirement after TRIPS, including after the proposed
Substantive Patent Law Treaty failed). It is also well understood that the TRIPS requirement
that countries grant patents to "useful" inventions gives countries flexibility to define this term
and consider domestic objectives, including public health. E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY, AND TRADE 171 (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/
pamtiwhowipowtowebl3_e.pdf.
163.
Gold & Shortt, supra note 158 at 35, 51-55, 72-83 (UK, Australia, New Zealand,
United States, and Europe).
164.

CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE

§

12.09 (1998 ed., rev. Dec. 2009), available at http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipoInternetInternetopic.nsf/vwapj/rpbb-mopop-eng.pdfl$file/rpbb-mopop-eng.pdf (noting that whether a golf
club is patentable relates to whether or not it "provides the promised utility of improving the
trajectory of a ball struck by the club").
165.
Eurocopter v. Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limitee, [2013] F.C. 219 (Can.), affg
[2012] F.C. 113.
166.
E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1.

2015]

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

331

Although some have characterized the doctrine as being
inconsistent with the research and development timeline since a
patent application may be filed before clinical data is available, those
concerns are overstated. First, the promise doctrine can be met
without clinical data if there is a "sound prediction." Moreover,
patents invalidated on this ground are generally secondary patents
that claim an improvement over an original, often broader patent.
These secondary patents are filed later, often after the product is
commercially successful and has already benefited from an initial
patent term. Thus, Canada applies the promise doctrine to prevent
additional patents for inventions that were already protected by an
In other
earlier patent and could be considered evergreening.
countries, a patent might be denied on other grounds, such as
obviousness.
The criticism of the promise doctrine as ambiguous is a
stronger one, but many patentability doctrines are ambiguous. For
example, courts have for years struggled to clearly articulate and
apply when an invention is obvious, as well as when a pharmaceutical
invention meets requirements of written description or enablement.
Considering that the promise doctrine has only recently been applied
and common law doctrine is meant to evolve, some ambiguity should
be expected. Indeed, even in the less than ten years that Canadian
courts have been applying the doctrine, there is arguably a trend
towards greater clarity. For example, whereas initially courts were
inconsistent in terms of where they found a promise-whether in the
claims or the specification-and what they would consider to be a
promise, recent decisions have more narrowly construed what
constitutes a promise. 167
There is arguably a separate criticism that the doctrine is
flawed as unpredictable and thus leads to uncertainty for
pharmaceutical companies that rely on patents.
However, this
criticism is a generic criticism that has been raised concerning a large
number of patent law doctrines.16 8 In addition, even outside the area
of pharmaceuticals, there are other patent issues that are
unpredictable, such as claim construction.
Further, there is
inherently some level of unpredictability with patents that are
167.
E.g., Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex, [2013] F.C. 186 (Can.) (finding that there should only
be a promise if "the inventor makes an explicit promise of a specific result" in a case involving
the drug sold as Plavix). Initially courts differed in terms of whether they found a promise in the
claims or the specification, and even in what would constitute a promise. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho,
Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Law Decisions,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=2480202.
168.
See generally Holman, supra note 14.
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presumed valid when issued, but always subject to invalidation.
Although some have noted that the doctrine is unpredictable because
different courts may come to different conclusions concerning the
same patent, that is no different than other patent doctrines.
The utility doctrine is obviously a patent requirement distinct
from patentable subject matter, which was the primary focus of this
symposium. However, Canada's approach is nonetheless an important
example of a different approach that a nation can take to comply with
international obligations under TRIPS to address the same
phenomena of secondary patents that India addressed more directly
The first
by excluding certain compounds from patentability.
Canadian Supreme Court case to apply this doctrine did so in the
context of an invention on a new use of a known compound-the use of
AZT to treat HIV/AIDS. 169 In other words, this is a situation that
might have been barred by India's Section 3(d) statute, which
prohibits not only new variations without increased efficacy, but new
uses.
IV. WHAT APPROACH(ES) ARE BOTH PERMISSIBLE AND DESIRABLE

This Part evaluates whether the approaches of India and
Canada noted in Part III are permissible under international law, as
well as whether they should be followed by other countries. This is
important not only because India and Canada have been criticized for
failing to comply with international law, but also because other
countries have either copied these laws, or are contemplating doing so.
This Part begins with an explanation of the fundamental patentability
requirements for most countries, pursuant to TRIPS. It then explains
why India and Canada's laws are both permissible under TRIPS. This
Part concludes by noting that although India and Canada can be
commended for attempting to address recognized problems with
pharmaceutical patents, there are still practical problems with their
approaches that suggest other countries should not adopt them
wholesale.
Other approaches for countries desirous of balancing
patent rights and public health are outlined as an alternative to
consider.
A. TRIPS
This Section explains the requirements of TRIPS-the most
important international agreement to consider in assessing what
approaches are permissible because it provides the first ever
169.

Apotex Inc. v. Welcome Found. Ltd., [2002] S.C.C. 77 (Can.).
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international requirements on substantive standards of patent
protection and does so for the majority of countries. 170 Although
TRIPS is a landmark agreement, it only requires "minimum," but not
uniform, standards. 171 To best understand what TRIPS requires, this
Section will first explain how TRIPS should be appropriately
interpreted using rules that apply to all international agreements.
1. Interpretive Framework for TRIPS
To properly assess what TRIPS requires, as well as whether
countries are complying with those requirements, it is important to
use the appropriate interpretive framework. According to Article 64 of
TRIPS, it is to be interpreted pursuant to WTO rules; the rules
governing interpretation of the WTO are elaborated in the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, which specifies that "customary rules of interpretation of
public international law" apply. 172
The customary rules of
interpretation are understood to refer to the principles expressed
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states
that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith, with "ordinary
meaning" to be given to the text of a treaty. 173 In other words, the
final text, rather than what individual parties desired but did not
succeed in getting in the final text, is important. Secondary material,
such as negotiating history, is only considered to confirm an
interpretation achieved by the traditional method of interpretation, or
if the usual interpretation leads to an interpretation that is
ambiguous or reaches an absurd result. 174 Importantly, this approach
to secondary materials is different than the approach taken by
predecessor panels to the WTO that interpreted the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).17 6 In addition, even when
negotiating history is considered, it is based on actual documents and

170.
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm. There are subsequent agreements that establish
higher standards, referred to as "TRIPS-plus" agreements. E.g., Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra
note 43, at 225-28. To the extent that these agreements bar suggestions requiring more than
TRIPS, some of the noted suggestions may be impermissible.
171.
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 1.1; Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 43, at 57.
172.
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 64; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
173.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Id. art. 32.
174.
175.
E.g., HIROKO YAMANE, INTERPRETING TRIPS: GLOBALISATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 191 (2011).
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cannot be based on the intent of one party. Along similar lines, if
language was proposed but not adopted, that should be interpreted as
meaning that it was rejected.
The Vienna Convention states that the ordinary meaning of
treaty terms should be viewed in appropriate "context," as well as in
light of the object and purpose of the agreement.1 7 6 Accordingly, a
fundamental issue to understanding what any specific TRIPS article
requires involves identifying and understanding the appropriate
context, as well as the object and purpose of the agreement. There are
three parts of TRIPS that provide appropriate context-the preamble,
and Articles 7 and 8. The Vienna Convention expressly considers the
treaty preamble to be part of the context. In addition, Articles 7 and 8
provide the object and purpose of TRIPS; indeed, they are entitled
"objectives" and "principles."
The preamble, as well as Articles 7 and 8, all point to a need to
consider patents not only from the perspective of the rights holder, but
also with respect to other social interests. The preamble of TRIPS
recognizes not just a need for standards concerning intellectual
property rights, such as patents, but also that there are domestic
public policy objectives.17 7 Similarly, Article 7 states that intellectual
property rights "should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation . . . to the mutual advantage of producers and users of

technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare . . . .""8 Article 7 thus seems to expressly note that
patent standards are not intended to solely benefit patent owners, but
should benefit society as a whole.' 7 9 Moreover, Article 8 expressly
notes public health as an important issue. In particular, Article 8
states that members may "adopt measures necessary to protect public
health," so long as those measures are consistent with TRIPS.18 0
Accordingly, the preamble, as well as Articles 7 and 8, all underscore
that patent standards are not intended to solely benefit patent
owners, but should benefit society as a whole; in addition, Article 8

.

176.
Vienna Convention, supra note 173, art. 31.1.
177.
TRIPS, supra note 22, pmbl. ("Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of
national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and
technological objectives . .
178.
Id. art. 7.
179.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD-ICTSD), RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 126

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD].
180.
TRIPS, supranote 22, art. 8.
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specifically emphasizes public health as a social issue to be
considered.1 8 1
Another pertinent context to examining any provision of TRIPS
is Article 1 of the agreement. This Article lays out the "minimum
standards" approach of TRIPS. It specifies that although nations may
provide more protection than required, they are free to decide how to
implement TRIPS.18 2 In other words, TRIPS contemplates diversity
among member state laws, rather than uniform laws.1 83
In addition to the context in TRIPS, the Vienna Convention
states that proper interpretation also includes consideration of any
subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding
the
interpretation of the treaty.1 84 This is important because there is a
2001 Doha Public Health Declaration that addresses the topic of drug
patents.185 Although a few argue that this Declaration is a mere
political statement of no interpretive weight,1 86 scholars generally
consider the Declaration to be a subsequent agreement. 8 7
181.
UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 179.
182.
TRIPS, supra note 22.
183.
Although members have flexibility, they should still expect that if their laws are
challenged, a WTO panel will evaluate whether the national laws in fact meet the standards and
will not give complete deference. E.g., Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 64-66, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997);
see also UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 179, at 28.
184.
Vienna Convention, supranote 173, art. 31(3)(a).
185.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supranote 39.
186.
See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1198, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYU.S. TRADE POLICY GUIDANCE ON WTO DECLARATION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES MAY NEED

CLARIFICATION 3 (2007) (noting that the United States considers the Doha Declaration to be a
political statement that does not modify TRIPS); PhRMA: WTO Doha Declaration Reaffirms
Value
of Intellectual Property Protection, PR
NEWSWIRE
(Nov.
14,
2001),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/phrma-wto-doha-declaration-reaffirms-value-ofintellectual-property-protection-74263327.html (stressing that the Declaration was a "political
statement"); Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Zoellick Says World Has Chosen
Path of Hope, Openness, Development and Growth (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2001/NovemberfUSTRZoellick
SaysWorldHasChosenPath ofHope,_Openness, DevelopmentGrowth.html
(referring to
USTR remarks on Doha Public Health Declaration as a "political signal").
187.
See, e.g., Carlos Correa, World Health Org. [WHO], Implications of the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, at 2 (June 2002), available at
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO-EDMPAR_2002.3.pdf;
Denis Borges Barbosa,
Slouching Towards Development in International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV.
71, 1131-32 (2007) (viewing the Doha Public Health Declaration as not only a subsequent
agreement, but one that establishes the right to health as an important right not to be trumped
by provisions of TRIPS in a call for a broader interpretation of evolving international norms);
Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 207, 211 (2002)
(evaluating both the Public Health Declaration and the Ministerial Declaration and concluding
that while their legal category is ambiguous, they could be considered subsequent agreements by
the parties); Susy Frankel, WTO Application of "The Customary Rules of Interpretationof Public
InternationalLaw" to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT'L. L. 365, 400-01 (2006) (using the Doha
Health Declaration as an example of a subsequent agreement between the parties, although also
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The Doha Declaration provides interpretive guidance on
specific provisions of TRIPS, as well as insight into the importance of
public health in interpreting TRIPS. In particular, the Declaration
states, "We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health," and
affirms that TRIPS "can and should be interpreted and implemented
in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."188

This statement could be construed as further elaborating on the
Article 8 principle concerning the relevance of public health.1 89 In
addition, the Declaration goes beyond Article 8 in adding more detail
concerning public health issues with respect to patents on drugs. In
particular, it states, "We recognize that intellectual property
protection is important for the development of new medicines. We
9 0 Importantly,
also recognize the concerns about its effects on prices."o
this quote not only underscores that patent protection is considered
important to incentivize the development of new medicine, but that
patent protection may increase costs of drugs.
The Declaration further confirms that in applying customary
rules of interpretation of international law, which as noted earlier is
what the Vienna Convention applies to, "each provision of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be read in light of the object and purpose of the
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
In other words, the Doha Declaration expressly
principles." 191
confirms the analysis above that TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, that are
titled "objectives" and "principles," guide how each provision of TRIPS,
including the patentability provisions, should be interpreted. This is
also consistent with an earlier WTO panel ruling that stated that
these provisions were relevant. 192

stating that the Declaration does not necessarily provide more clarity to rules that were already
clear); Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon, An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declarationon the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 212, 212 (2002) (noting that the
Declaration constitutes a supplementary means of interpretation); Cynthia M. Ho, Patent
Breaking or Balancing?: SeparatingStrands of Fact from Fiction under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COMMERCIAL REG. 373, 392 (2009).
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 39, 1 4.
188.
UNCTAD-ICSTD, supra note 179, at 131. Moreover, it is suggested that since this is
189.
stated in the form of an agreement it could be considered a "decision" of members under the
WTO. Id.; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX(2),
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 39, 1 3.
190.
191.
Id. ¶ 5(a).
192.
Panel on Canada Patent Protection of Pharm. Prods., Report of the Panel,
WT/DS114/R 1 7.26 (Mar. 17, 2000) (noting that "the goals and the limitations stated in Articles
7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind" in interpreting other TRIPS provisions).
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There is, of course, an important question of how broadly to
interpret the Doha Declaration provision that TRIPS requirements
should be read in a way to not only promote public health generally,
but also to promote access to medicines for all. 1 93 One way to ensure
low-cost drugs is to bar patents on any drugs, since patents permit
their owner to charge a premium. However, that would completely
nullify the fundamental requirement of TRIPS that nations must
grant patents on "inventions" without discrimination as to "subject
matter," because there must be some drugs that would be inventions
and barring all of them would clearly discriminate based on subject
matter. Thus, barring all drugs is not a possible interpretation. At
the other end of the interpretive spectrum, some might suggest that
all aspects of the Declaration should be limited to the situation noted
in the first paragraph of the Declaration, which refers to public health
problems of developing countries and especially those resulting from
epidemics. 194 However, if that were true, it would negate TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8, which recognize the need to balance patent rights
against other public policy objectives. 9 5 The most appropriate
interpretation seems to be that the Declaration recognizes that public
policy, expressly noted in TRIPS, includes the impact of patents on the
cost of drugs and further supports the idea that nations should be
given some leeway in their interpretation of TRIPS.
The fact that the Doha Declaration focuses expressly on
pharmaceuticals and their impact on drug prices also lends further
support to the fact that nations may be permitted to differentiate
without violating the discrimination requirement. In particular, the
very existence of the Declaration, in addition to the earlier WTO panel
decision that first articulated the differentiation concept, suggests
that members recognize that the area of pharmaceutical patents and
their impact on public health is an issue deserving of special attention.
In addition, member states do have laws that differentiate based on
pharmaceuticals that have never been challenged. For example, a
number of nations provide additional patent terms on drugs to
compensate for the period of patent protection that is essentially

193.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 39, T 4.
Id. ¶ 1.
194.
195.
Although there are aspects of these articles that talk about development, they are
not limited solely to developing countries in the process of development. In particular, Article 8
notes that member states can adopt TRIPS-consistent laws to promote public health without
qualification of development status, and it separately states that members may adopt measures
to promote public interest in sectors of "vital socioeconomic and development." TRIPS, supra note
22, art. 8. Moreover, TRIPS Article 7 refers to the need to balance the interests of producers and
users of technology "in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare," without any
reference that this should apply only to countries of a particular development status. Id. art. 7.
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drug is under regulatory review. 196 In
of patentability for drugs, as well as
license rules for drugs, exist without
sometimes criticized.197

2. TRIPS Requirements
The crux of patent requirements at issue appear in TRIPS
Article 27, which states, "[P]atents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
of industrial application.

. .

. [P]atents shall be available .

.

. without

discrimination as to . . . the field of technology." 19 8 This provision does
two things. First, it establishes criteria for patentability that are
basically the standards that have been used in industrialized
countries, such as the United States, Japan, and EU member states. 199
Second, TRIPS does not define critical requirements, such as
what constitutes a "new" invention, or even the more fundamental
question of what constitutes an "invention." As previously noted,
TRIPS is intended to provide minimum, but not uniform standards.
The lack of definition of terms such as what is a "new" invention,
accordingly, gives nations flexibility to define these terms on their own
when there is no international consensus. 200 This is supported by

196.
See supra note 74 (indicating patent term extensions in the United States,
Australia, South Korea and Japan to account for time lost to regulatory approval).
197.
India has a different law on patentability of drugs. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970,
A.I.R. MANUAL 450, §3(d) (India). In addition, French patent law has a different compulsory
license provision on pharmaceutical products. Loi 92-597 du 1992, CODE DE LA PROPRIETt
INTELLECTUELLE, July 1, 1992, arts. 613-16 (Fr.).
198.
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 27. There are some types of subject matter explicitly
excluded as methods of treatment: plants and animals and essentially biological processes, as
well as inventions. Id. art. 27(3). In addition, there is a broader exception to permit exclusion
from patentability of inventions when their commercial exploitation would interfere with ordre
public or morality. Id. art. 27(2).
199.
Although these terms are not identical to US patentability standards, a footnote to
TRIPS clarifies that the terms "inventive step" and "industrial application" are intended to be
synonymous with the US terms "nonobvious" and "useful." See TRIPS, supra note 22, at art. 27
n.5.

200.

E.g., UNCTAD-ICSTSD, CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON IPRS 393 (2005); WHO-

UNCTAD-ICTSD PHARMACEUTICAL GUIDELINES (2007); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 272

(2007); Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM
GATT TO TRIPS 187 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); Carlos M. Correa,
Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health
Perspective (WHO-UNCTAD-ICTSD, Working Paper, 2007), available at http://apps.who.int/
medicinedocs/documents/s21419en/s21419en.pdf [hereinafter Correa, Guidelines]; Matthias
Lamping et al., Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 INT'L
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pharmaceutical guidelines issued by the World Health Organization in
conjunction with a UN body that deals with development issues; the
guidelines recommend taking advantage of this flexibility to consider
certain subject matter not inventive, such as new forms of existing
pharmaceutical products. 20 1 History also supports this approach.
Historically, some states have not patented new forms or properties of
known inventions, such that it is reasonable for states to continue to
do so under TRIPS, or only do so under qualified conditions, such as
enhanced efficacy. 202 This is particularly true because the WTO
dispute settlement process to address alleged violations of WTO
agreements, including TRIPS, prohibits panels from creating new law,
such that they cannot resolve deliberate textual ambiguities that are
designed to reflect the compromises and balances reached by
negotiating parties. 203
There is a fundamental question of what constitutes an
"invention" because only inventions must be subject to the stated
criteria. Some might suggest that any subject matter that meets the
other patentability criteria of being new and nonobvious would suffice.
However, if that were true, the word "invention" would not be
necessary, such that the inclusion of the term "invention" must have
some separate meaning under standard tools of treaty interpretation.
This would also be consistent with prior national practice before
TRIPS, pursuant to which nations had different standards of what
constituted patentable subject matter. For example, there were
differences in whether genes and computer software were considered
patentable. Similarly, some, but not all, countries permitted patents
on methods of use of known products.
Countries cannot bar an entire category of inventions, such as
drug products, because that would discriminate based on a field of
technology. 204 However, since the conclusion of TRIPS, there is a
dispute over what constitutes discrimination concerning a field of

REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 679 (forthcoming 2015),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2500784.
201.
Correa, Guidelines, supra note 200, at 3-4, 6-7, 9-11 (suggesting exclusion of
similar compounds, including different formulations of the same active ingredient, or slight
modifications of the active ingredient, such as salts and polymorphs).
202.
Id. at 6-7.
203.
DSU, supra note 172, art. 3(2) (can not "add to or diminish" covered agreements);
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 355 (1999) (prohibiting adding rights and obligations); see
also Report of the Panel, supra note 192, ¶ 7.26 (warning against interpretations that "would be
equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement"); Correa, supra note 200, at
273.
204.
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 27; see also HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 43, at
63.
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technology besides the outright denial of patents on an entire class of
inventions. One WTO panel report made an important distinction
between "improper discrimination" versus "legitimate differentiation";
the panel stated that TRIPS "does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to
deal with problems that exist only in certain product areas." 205 The
panel did not provide a general rule regarding what would be a bona
fide purpose and its finding is technically not binding on other panels.
Nonetheless, WTO panels generally consider prior decisions to be
persuasive authority and noted intellectual property scholars have
praised the distinction between discrimination and differentiation. 2 0 6
B. Is India's Section 3(d) Law Consistent with TRIPS?
A key question is whether India's Section 3(d) provision is
consistent with TRIPS.
Although a number of commentators,
including the powerful lobbying group for companies that sell
patented drugs, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA), have suggested that this provision violates TRIPS,
it is notable that no country has thus far formally challenged India
since the provision was adopted in 2005.207 Nonetheless, it may be
useful to consider criticisms of this provision and whether such
criticisms are appropriate in light of a proper interpretation of TRIPS.
PhRMA claims that India's Section 3(d) law violates TRIPS for
two different reasons. First, PhRMA asserts that India has added "a
fourth substantive criteria of 'enhanced efficacy.' 208 PhRMA also
claims that because Section 3(d) only applies to pharmaceuticals, it
violates the nondiscrimination principle in TRIPS Article 27.209
Similarly, Roy Waldron, Chief IP Counsel of Pfizer, testified before
Congress in 2013 that India has "systematically failed to interpret and
apply its intellectual property laws in a manner consistent with global
standards." 210
205.
Report of the Panel, supra note 192, ¶¶ 7.92, 7.94.
206.
E.g., Graeme Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating:
Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REV. 445
(2007); see also Burk & Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1155, 1157-58 (2002) (noting that although US law is technology neutral, in practice, it is
technology specific).
207.
E.g., PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 26; PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF
AM., SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2015, 48-49, available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/
files/pdfl2014-special-301-submission.pdf [hereinafter PhRMA 2015 SUBMISSION].
208.
PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 26; PhRMA 2015 SUBMISSION, supra
note 207, at 49.
209.
PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supranote 1, at 26.
210.
Hearing on U.S.-India Trade Relations: Opportunities and Challenges Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Trade, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) (statement of Roy
Waldron, Pfizer Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Written Testimony).
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Contrary to PhRMA's contentions, there are several possible
reasons why the Section 3(d) law may be permissible under TRIPS
Article 27. First, Section 3(d) could be considered to help clarify what
is not an eligible "invention" under TRIPS, rather than a fourth
requirement. Second, Section 3(d) could be considered to simply
provide a new interpretation of "novelty" or "inventive step," In
addition, as will be explained, in neither of these situations is India's
action inconsistent with the nondiscrimination principle, since India is
legitimately differentiating, rather than discriminating.
India's Section 3(d) law can be considered a permissible
limitation on what is an "invention" under TRIPS. As noted earlier,
although TRIPS requires that an "invention" be patented, it does not
define what constitutes an "invention," thus giving member states
discretion to define this themselves. Moreover, India's Section 3(d)
provision is actually Part (d) of Section 3 of the Indian Patent Act;
Section 3 of the Indian Patent Act is entitled, "What are not
inventions." The fifteen items listed in Section 3 include things that
are traditionally considered not patentable inventions in many
countries, such as discovery of scientific principles and methods of
medical treatment; thus Section 3(d) seems to be an interpretation of
what is not a patentable invention. 2 11
India's Section 3(d) provision can alternatively be considered
TRIPS consistent as a permissible interpretation of the "novelty" or
"inventive step" requirements of TRIPS that are similarly undefined.
In particular, Section 3(d) could be interpreted as providing a new
definition of what pharmaceutical inventions would be considered new
or as having an inventive step. For example, Section 3(d)'s bar of a
new use for a known compound from the scope of patentable
inventions could be considered an interpretation of the novelty
requirement. Similarly, the requirement under Section 3(d) that
similar compounds are not patentable unless they show improved
efficacy could be interpreted as a new type of inventive step standard,
in that what is similar to existing pharmaceutical inventions is
considered not inventive unless it shows improved efficacy. Indeed,
Indian courts have made this suggestion.
For example, the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board stated that this provision "is
nothing but a requirement of higher standard of inventive step" in an

211.
See The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3 (India). In addition,
some other exceptions may not be common to US patent law, but are common to other countries,
such as bars to inventions on methods of treatment, as well as inventions contrary to morality.
Compare id. § 3(b) (contrary to morality), with Convention on the Grant of European Patents art.
53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 (1974) (contrary to morality), and id. § 3(i) (methods of
treatment), with Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 53(c) (methods of treatment).
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opinion that focused on the application of Section 3(d) to Novartis's
rejected patent application on cancer drug Gleevec. 2 12
India's Section 3(d) provision is also consistent with the TRIPS
requirement of nondiscrimination in granting of patents, although the
analysis is more complex. It is true that Section 3(d) only refers to
pharmaceuticals since the example lists compounds that only exist in
the pharmaceutical industry. However, as noted earlier, countries are
permitted to have rules that differentiate between different subject
matter for problems that are unique to a particular field.
Understanding why India's Section 3(d) provision should be
considered permissible requires an evaluation of the previously noted
WTO panel decision that distinguished permissible differentiation
versus impermissible discrimination, as well as the Doha Public
Health Declaration.
The prior WTO panel found that a Canadian law that provided
an exception from patent infringement for generic companies to make
limited amounts of a patented drug during a patent term was
appropriately "limited," and thus consistent with a TRIPS provision
permitting limited exceptions to usual patent rights. 2 13 Importantly,
the panel noted that although the exception from patent infringement
only applied to drug companies, the TRIPS requirement barring
discrimination against a field of technology "does not prohibit bona
fide exceptions to deal with problems that exist only in certain product
areas." 2 14 In particular, because patented drugs are one of the few
patented products to need regulatory approval to be sold, if a generic
version of the patented drug had to wait until after patent expiry to
start the regulatory approval process, the owner of the patented
version would actually get an undue extension of their patent term.
Given the unique problem of this industry, the fact that the exception
only seemed to apply to pharmaceuticals was considered appropriate
differentiation, rather than discrimination. Similarly, India's Section
3(d) provision is addressing the evergreening phenomena that only
seems to occur in the pharmaceutical arena. 2 15
212.
Novartis v. Union of India,(2013) 6 S.C.C 1, ¶ 17 (India) (citing Appellee Board
decision).
Report of the Panel, supra note 192, ¶ 7.99.
213.
Id. ¶ 7.92.
214.
215.
See The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3(d) (India). On the other
hand, the prior WTO case is somewhat different in that the Canadian law at issue was neutral
on its face in discussing use of a patented product for development and submission of information
for any law that regulates sale of a product, such that it did not explicitly apply only to
pharmaceuticals. Report of the Panel, supra note 192, ¶¶ 7.95-7.96. However, the Indian law
could still be considered neutral on its face in that it talks about "known substances" without
specifying the field of pharmaceuticals. However, the "explanation" in the law does talk about
substances that would seem to primarily appear in the pharmaceutical arena such as salts and
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In addition, it is important to note that the prior WTO panel
decision preceded the Doha Public Health Declaration that now
establishes the importance of considering public health implications in
interpreting TRIPS patent provisions.
As noted earlier, the
Declaration states that the Agreement "can and should be interpreted
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all." 2 1 6 This statement indicates an understanding
among WTO members that public health and access to affordable
medicine are of concern in interpreting TRIPS. Moreover, the fact
that the Declaration also explicitly recognizes the impact of patent
protection on drug prices and the need to interpret all TRIPS
provisions to consider public health, suggests that application of even
the nondiscrimination clause be applied in a way that supports public
health. 2 17 In other words, although it would be impermissible to bar
patents on all drugs, the more narrowly tailored provision of Section
3(d) that aims to address a unique problem in pharmaceuticals, seems
to be appropriate differentiation, and not discrimination. A number of
other scholars support this interpretation. 2 18
C. Is Canada'sPromise Doctrine Permissible Under International
Law?
Evaluating whether Canada's unique promise doctrine is
permissible under international law requires an evaluation of not only
TRIPS, but also NAFTA. Whereas most countries are members of
TRIPS, only the United States, Canada, and Mexico are members of
NAFTA; however, the United States negotiated both agreements at
roughly the same time, and sought similar provisions in each. 219
esters. Nonetheless, it may be helpful that the prior panel held that, even though a law that "in
effect" only applied to pharmaceuticals, it does not indicate a discriminatory purpose. Id.
216.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 39, N 4.
217.
See id. ¶ 3 ("We recognize the concerns about [intellectual property's] effects on
prices"); id. ¶ 5(a) (noting each TRIPs provision should be read in light of its "objectives and
principles"); see also TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 8 (titled "Principles").
218.

E.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

358 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that because Doha focuses on pharmaceutical products, this further
supports a WTO panel decision that bona fide differentiation is not discrimination); Amy
Kapczynski, Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1598 (2009) ("[E]xceptions to
patentability adopted in order to protect public health might not be deemed to discriminate by
field of technology, even if they have applications only to particular fields."); Doha Public Health
Declaration, supra note 39, 1 5.
219.
See Martin D.H. Woodward, TRIPS and NAFTA's Chapter 17: How Will TradeRelated Multilateral Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269, 274
(1996).
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One allegation is that Canada's promise doctrine is
inconsistent with the utility requirement under TRIPS as well as
NAFTA. PhRMA has stated that the "heightened standard" of utility
violates TRIPS because it "imposes onerous and unjustified
patentability criteria," narrowing the scope of inventions that receive
patent protection. 220 PhRMA alleges that "all [other] developed
countries require only that an invention be 'useful' or 'capable of
industrial application,"' while ignoring the fact that proper
interpretation of TRIPS permits Canada to define what is useful when
this is not defined by TRIPS. Similarly, Eli Lilly, a multinational
pharmaceutical company that is part of PhRMA, claims separately
that Canada's interpretation of the utility requirement "contradicts
the standard" accepted by NAFTA parties. 221
The claims that Canada's promise doctrine is impermissible
under the utility requirement of TRIPS and NAFTA are without basis.
Although these are separate agreements, they have the same
requirement on utility-it is stated as a requirement for patents, but
not defined. 222 As noted earlier, undefined terms in minimum
standard agreements such as TRIPS and NAFTA explicitly
contemplate that countries may adopt different standards, including
providing their own unique definitions of the undefined standards. 223
Eli Lilly's claim that Canada's interpretation "contradicts" what was
previously accepted by the parties is completely inconsistent with
proper interpretation of international agreements, which focuses on
the text of the agreement and not unsubstantiated claims of what the
countries accepted. It is true that Canada previously had a different
view of the utility requirement. However, no conventional tool of
treaty interpretation requires that member states' laws be read into
the treaty provisions as part of the text.
Canada's law is also accused of violating the TRIPS
nondiscrimination requirement. PhRMA has alleged that the law
"discriminates against innovative pharmaceutical companies." 224 Eli

220.
PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 76; PHRMA 2015 SUBMISSION, supra
note 207, at 81 (claiming heightened standard inconsistent with TRIPS).
221.
Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 161; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada,
Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 (Nov. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawll72.pdf
(seeking
$100 million in damages after its patent on a drug to treat attention deficit disorder sold as
Strattera).
222.
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 27; North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1709,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
223.
See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
224.
PHRMA 2014 SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 76.
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Lilly has also made this claim. 2 2 5 However, this claim is equally
inappropriate with Canada's patent laws as with India's laws. So long
as the domestic law is intended to deal with the evergreening
phenomena that only happens in this industry, there is no improper
discrimination, and rather, is solely an issue of appropriate
differentiation.
D. Evaluating Underlying Policies and Alternative Approaches
Whereas the prior sections addressed what is permissible
under TRIPS, this Section addresses what would be desirable as a
matter of domestic policy, since patents are fundamentally tools to
In particular, this Section notes that
promote domestic policy.
although the Indian and Canadian provisions are important to
consider as first attempts at better tailoring patent law to promote
desired innovation and better access to low-cost drugs, further
experimentation with either variations of these provisions, or entirely
different approaches altogether, is recommended.
A major issue with both patent provisions is that it may be
difficult for companies to meet these standards given the practicalities
of drug discovery, as well as patent law fundamentals. In particular,
both laws-depending on interpretation-may require applicants to
provide clinical data concerning a drug that does not yet exist. This is
because patent applications are filed as soon as a chemical compound
is discovered in a lab that seems like it may be promising for some
type of drug, but long before any animal or even human tests are
conducted to see if the compound in fact could be effective and safe as
a drug. To obtain a patent, an application must be filed promptly to
meet the fundamental requirement that it is "new," such that waiting
for clinical test results is not possible. Accordingly, pharmaceutical
companies may have a basis for complaining that these standards may
place them in a catch-22 situation. 226
Consequently, although some countries are eager to address
evergreening and copy India's Section 3(d) provision, that may not be
the best approach. 227 Although the fundamental tension between
225.
E.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 161, ¶¶ 12, 42 (Sept. 12, 2013)
(alleging violation of NAFTA nondiscrimination requirement as well as TRIPS).
226.
E.g., id. ¶ 67; Canadian Patent Util. Coal., Guest Post: The US Government
Continues to Have "Serious Concerns" with Canada's Heightened Patent Utility Requirements,
PATENT DOCS (May 5, 2014), http://www.patentdoes.org/2014/05/guest-post-the-us-governmentcontinues-to-have-serious-concerns-with-canadas-heightened-patent-utili.html.
227.
E.g., Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008, Rep. Act
No. 9502, §§ 1-2 (Phil.); CHAN PARK ET AL., USING LAW TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN
SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT, COMPETITION AND MEDICINES LAW 41-46 (U.N.

Development Programme 2013) (suggesting that South Africa should consider copying not only
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meeting the "new" requirement of patentability and not having
relevant clinical data could potentially be mediated with modification
of these laws or how they are applied, 228 further consideration and
experimentation with different approaches to address evergreening
would be a better idea. 2 2 9 This is especially true since the India and
Canadian laws may have been adopted under less than ideal
circumstances. India's provision was crafted quickly to comply with a
TRIPS deadline after an initial proposal was deemed to be likely not
in compliance with TRIPS. 2 30 Canada's promise doctrine is even less
likely to be well tailored to evergreening. Unlike India's provision,
Canada's doctrine was not considered by a legislature; rather, it was
simply announced by a court and subsequently followed by other
courts.
There are also other avenues to address evergreening. For
example, a more stringent nonobviousnes standard could address
evergreening.
However, for countries like India that have
and a substantial number of
understaffed patent offices
pharmaceutical patent applications, a bright-line exclusion from

India's patent law, but the law of Argentina that excludes similar compounds even if they have
improved efficacy); PEDRO PARANAGUA ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. & DEBATES, BRAZIL'S
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 114 (2013), available at

http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/BrazilianPatentReform.pdf
(noting
that
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil have signed an agreement that acknowledges
concerns about "proliferation of patent application on matters that do not properly constitute an
invention" with "negative effects to access to medicines"); Divya Rajagopal, EU, Australia,
Canada May Follow India's Patent Law, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:00 AM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-04/news/38278712_1_patent-act-patentprotection-patent-quality; Gireesh Chandra Prasad, Copycats Popping Patent Law Pill, EcON.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2007, 4:03 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-0813/news/27677651_1_-patent-law-section-3d-dg-shah (reporting that Maldives, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh are reported to consider adopting
provisions similar to India's Section 3(d) proposal).
228.
Canadian courts, for example, have recently taken a more narrow approach to
applying the promise doctrine, which has resulted in drug patents being found valid. E.g., Teva
Can. v. Novartis, [2013] F.C. 141, T$ 164-65 (Can.) (finding a patent covering the cancer drug
sold as Gleevec by Novartis to be consistent with the promise doctrine even without test data and
noting that this doctrine is not intended to "give a crushing hammer to those who challenge
patents"); Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., [2013] F.C. 186 (Can.) (reversing trial court decision
that had found Sanofi's patent on the active ingredient of blockbuster drug sold as Plavix to fail
the promise doctrine because the trial court improperly inferred a promise and holding that this
doctrine is inapplicable unless the patent makes an explicit promise of a specific result).
229.
See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774.
230.
E.g., Novartis v. Union of India, (2013) 6 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 76 (India). In addition, India's
provision is actually in part copied from an EU regulatory provision concerning when a proposed
generic can rely on earlier clinical data, such that it may not be appropriately tailored to
patentability standards. See Council Directive 2004/27/EC, art. 10(2)(b). 2004 J.O. (L 136) 36
(EC).
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patentability could be considered more efficient and thus desirable. 231
Alternatively, a more robust examination of patentability can be
easily enhanced without changing any patentability standards. For
example, permitting third parties to challenge patents, and even
patent applications, would help; indeed, India permits both types of
challenges. Countries could also improve the validity of patents
through additional governmental help outside the patent office; the
regulatory agency that approves drugs for sale could do its own
analysis of patentability in addition to the patent office. 232
Of course, there are those that would resist any of these
approaches because of concern that they unduly hinder innovation by
either reducing the patent term or entirely barring patentability of
drugs. For example, the United States has criticized other countries
that permit third parties to challenge patent applications as creating
unnecessary delay in issuance of patents, and thus limiting patent
terms that are generally calculated as a function of when the patent
application was filed. 2 33

In addition, the pharmaceutical industry

would likely object to any changes to the patent system that would
restrict what is patentable given the fact that they have sought more
protection. Moreover, there are many who believe that the problem is
not that the pharmaceutical industry is patenting too much, but
rather, that it needs more protection. This Article alone is unlikely to
sway any of those adherents, but hopefully it has at least highlighted
that this view is not the only possible one.
V. CONCLUSION
Hopefully this Article has helped raise awareness not only
about current problems with drug patents, but has also illustrated the
existence of different approaches that are permissible under TRIPS.
Given the long US history of granting patents on drugs as well as a
recent history of favoring rights of patent owners over consumer
access, the United States is unlikely to modify its laws to address the
problems recognized by other countries. However, it would still be
231.
Shamnad Basheer & T. Prashant Reddy, The Efficacy of Indian Patent Law: Ironing
Out the Creases in Section 3(d), 5 SCRIPTED 232, 258 (2008).
232.
This is in fact the approach of Brazil. C6DIGO DE PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRIAL [C.P.I.]
art. 229(C) (Braz.) (requiring consent of Brazilian regulatory authority to granting of drug
patents); see also PARANAGUA ET AL., supra note 227 (recommending that the Brazilian
regulatory authorities responsible for approving drugs for sale, ANVISA, continue to help ensure
valid patents, with some small modifications for improvement); Tahir Amin et al., Expert Review
of Drug Patent Applications: Improving Health in the Developing World, 28 HEALTH AFF. 948,
954 (2009) (noting Brazil requires a review by government public health experts before a patent
is granted).
233.
2014 SPECIAL 301 REP., supra note 161, at 40.
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beneficial to recognize that there is a problem and to avoid
exacerbating it.
In particular, it is most desirable to resist the
entreaties to increase protection for drugs. In addition, recognizing
that there is a problem could result in less US pressure on other
countries to modify laws that are in fact permissible and can be
justified as proper policy for those countries.

